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vAbstract
In Chapter 1, I conduct a theoretical study of how horizontal industry concentration affects
a firm’s market capitalization and systematic risk. I first develop a method for incorpo-
rating an equilibrium theory of the firm, drawn from industrial organization, into a single
period version of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). This extension establishes the
microeconomic determinants of systematic risk by relating firm specific variables to Beta.
Unlike the previous literature, I add local product market shocks to a general, deterministic
profit function and use an orthogonal decomposition of the market return to endogenize the
Cov[Ri, RM ]. I also use this method with standard Hotelling and Cournot models of firm
behavior and with different sources of uncertainty to provide examples of how increasing
concentration can increase, decrease, and be independent of Beta. In Chapter 2, I exploit
a natural experiment afforded by the announcement of ‘Paragraph IV’ patent infringement
decisions. These judgments have two unique features. They create an exogenous change in
industry concentration, since they determine whether the corporate owner of a brand name
prescription drug will maintain or lose monopoly marketing rights. They also satisfy the
methodological requirements to use a short window event study. Against a backdrop of con-
tradictory empirical evidence, this experiment provides a clean test to empirically determine
the sign of how a change in horizontal industry concentration affects stock returns. For a
sample of 38 District Court decisions between 1992 and 2006, I find that the announcement
return is between [1.24%, 2.83%] if the brand firm ‘wins’ the case and between [-5.24%,
-5.82%] if the brand ‘loses’. Finally, I use these returns to construct the first market val-
uation of the monopoly rents for brand name pharmaceutical firms. I find that the value
to a brand firm of maintaining marketing exclusivity for 1 ‘average’ drug for 92 months is
between [6.48%, 8.65%]. In Chapter 3, I explore the cross-sectional determinants of Beta.
The two main goals of this exercise is to understand the explanatory power of popular as-
set pricing variables and firm level variables, such as the coefficient of variation of profit.
vi
The estimation relies on a minimum distance approach that reduces to the familiar least
squares estimators. This approach permits the estimation of a dataset where the number
of cross sectional observations is larger than the number of time period and accounts for
the measurement error in Beta. I use two different sets of variables where one is weighted
by assets, referred to as ‘Book’ variables and the other is weighted by market capitaliza-
tion, referred to as ‘Market’ variables. I include two robust checks, one of which includes
adding industry fixed effects. I find some striking results with respect to both the two asset
pricing variables and the coefficient of variation of profit proxy. Since my statistics are
pooled over different time periods, I cite the statistics from the 2001 subperiod because it
has three times as many observations as the rest of the periods combined. Turnover has the
largest magnitude and t-statistics in both sets of regressions. In 2001, the means of Beta A
and Beta were .94 and 1.2 respectively. I found that a one standard deviation change in
turnover increased the magnitude of Beta A by .22 and Beta by .25. The bid ask spread
percentage had a larger magnitude coefficient in the ‘Market Regressions’, which indicated
that a one standard deviation change in this variable increased Beta by .08. On the other
hand, I found that ln(assets), ln(size), and book-to-market had the smallest magnitudes
and t-statistics. Finally, both regressions indicate that as the proxy for the coefficient of
variation of profit variable increases (decreases) for firms with a positive (negative) expected
profit, Beta increases. For the 2001 subperiod in the ‘Market’ regressions, a one standard
deviation change in the absolute value of this proxy, increases Beta by a magnitude of .1
and .15 for firms with positive and negative ‘earnings’. Finally, these results are robust to
industry fixed effects.
vii
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1Chapter 1
Industry Concentration,
Systematic Risk, and a
Micro-Foundation for the CAPM
1.1 Introduction
Asset pricing models have been developed, somewhat myopically, with little reference to
the product market and therefore to industrial organization. The best known asset pricing
models base their predictions on variations in investor preferences, behavioral biases in
financial markets, or each asset’s covariance with a market portfolio. Remarkably, these
models disregard how economic fundamentals in the product market, such as firm specific
or industry wide characteristics, may affect financial equilibria. Fama [17] acknowledged this
omission when he advocated that researchers should either relate the behavior of expected
returns to “the real economy in a rather detailed way” [p1610] or establish that no such
relationship exists.
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) provides an excellent example of an equilib-
rium financial model in which asset prices are derived independent of the ‘real economy’.
The CAPM’s main insight is that an asset’s expected excess return is determined by its
covariance with a market or aggregate portfolio. The covariance is included in an assets’s
Beta term, which within the capital budgeting framework, may be interpreted as a risk
adjusted discount rate. While the CAPM relates a firm’s Beta term1 to its expected return,
the model provides no relationship between a firm’s profits and its Beta term. Therefore,
the model cannot predict which type of firm strategies, types of competition, or industry
1For the rest of this chapter, I only consider assets which derive their underlying value from a firm.
2characteristics create more systematic risk. In terms of capital budgeting, there is no way
to update the risk adjusted discount rate in response to product market changes.
In this chapter, I conduct a theoretical investigation of how industry concentration2 af-
fects a firm’s market capitalization and systematic risk within the CAPM framework. I first
incorporate an equilibrium theory of firm behavior into the CAPM. This extended version
of the CAPM can combine models of both perfect and imperfect industry competition with
a competitive model of security pricing. Therefore, I contribute to the emerging theoretical
literature establishing a micro-foundation for asset pricing models.3 I then use this exten-
sion of the CAPM with two standard models of firm behavior, the Hotelling model and
the Cournot model, to test the effects of concentration.4 These examples illustrate how
product market factors, such as different types of firm competition or different sources of
uncertainty, influence the way in which concentration affects financial outcomes.
Although firm level variables, such as risky cash flows and the capital structure, have
been related to the CAPM since the early 1970’s, (Rubinstein [55]), the literature incorpo-
rating an equilibrium theory firm behavior into the CAPM has been sparse. Subrahmanyam
and Thomadakis [58] used a quantity choosing model of firm behavior and the Lerner Index
to coincidentally study the effect of industry concentration. They found that for a given
capital labor ratio, decreasing concentration increased systematic risk. Bhattacharyya and
Leach [6] applied the CAPM valuation formula to firm profit and found conditions under
which Beta is independent of the quantity chosen. Kazumori [36] used the consumption
CAPM and the idea of consumption risk, the cost of switching products if the product fails,
to find that increasing market share increased systematic risk. As an increasingly asymmet-
ric distribution of market shares also represents increased concentration, Kazumori’s results
2Because there are many different measures of horizontal industry concentration, this chapter uses the
number of firms as a proxy.
3The current literature establishing a micro foundation for other asset pricing mostly focuses on real
option models. Berk, Green, and Naik [4], who along with Gomes, Kogan, and Zhang [23], Kogan [38],
Zhang [63], Carlson, Giammarino, and Fisher [11], and Cooper [12] use real options models to relate various
firm characteristics, such as size, investment irreversibility, and book-to-market ratio, to systematic risk.
Options models are based on an absence of arbitrage arguments, and they only look at a single asset. In
contrast, the CAPM is multi-security equilibrium model. Irvine and Pontiff [33] create a simple model linking
a firm’s fundamental cash flow volatility to stock returns through a present discounted value argument.
However, these arguments require the risk adjusted discount rate to be independent of the firm’s actions
since there is no mechanism to endogenize the discount rate. This is not an issue in the CAPM’s equilibrium
environment.
4These two models were chosen because the first is a standard price choosing model with the addition of
product differentiation and the second is a standard quantity choosing model. I use these well established
models so that outcomes from the financial model cannot be attributed to a pathological formulation of firm
behavior.
3contradicts the sign of the results found by Subrahmanyam and Thomadakis.
The literature in this field can be compared according to two salient features of the
models. The first feature is the structure of uncertainty. In their one period model, Sub-
rahmanyam and Thomadakis [58] use an additive shock to the demand function and to the
labor supply. Bhattacharyya and Leach [6] use state probability pricing. Finally, Kazu-
mori [36] uses a continuous time stochastic calculus framework with shocks to consumption
at each period. The structure of uncertainty in these papers makes it difficult to study the
effect of a different parameter on systematic risk, add uncertainty to a different parameter,
or change the character of firm competition within the framework of these models.5
On the other hand, I add local product market shocks to a general profit function
which provides a more general framework. Product market shocks are simply a shock
added to any primitive of a profit function, such as costs or consumer preferences. This
method characterizes the effect of a small amount of uncertainty by linearly approximating a
random profit function. Many deterministic models from industrial organization can easily
be used within this framework. Therefore, unlike the previous literature, my method is not
dependent on the exact model of firm behavior or which parameters are shocked.
The second salient feature of the literature is the way the Cov[Ri, RM ], or more gen-
erally, βi, is endogenized.6 Let µ be the Sharpe Ratio and let pii be firm i’s random cash
flow. Lustgarten and Thomadakis [44] found βi =
Cov[pii,
∑N
j=1 pij ]
Var[
∑N
j=1 pij ]
∑N
k=1(E[pik]−µCov[pik,
∑N
j=1 pij ])
E[pii]−µCov[pii,
∑N
j=1 pij ]
.
Bhattacharyya and Leach [6] derived βi =
µCov[pii,RM ]
E[pii]−µCov[pii,RM ]
Rf
E[RM ]−Rf . Kazumori [36] used
the standard consumption βi =
σRi(t)σe(t)
σe(t)σe(t)
which is the covariance between a security’s return
and aggregate consumption divided by the variance of aggregate consumption. To examine
how systematic risk changes with concentration, these authors had to determine how these
complicated formulations of βi were affected.
In contrast, I orthogonally decompose the market return to rewrite the Cov[Ri, RM ]
more tractably in terms of the standard deviation of firm i’s profit. The exogenous market
return is decomposed into the covariance between the product market risk and the market
return multiplied by the product market risk plus another random variable that is uncor-
related with the product market risk. Then the Cov[Ri, RM ] can be expressed roughly as
5Kazumori [36] provides the most extreme example. By assuming that the dominant firm always increases
its price mark-up, he finds a Markov perfect equilibria in which agents want to purchase more from the firm
with the largest market share and this dominant firm always increases its market share.
6Ri is the return for firm i’s share, RM is the return for the market, and βi = Cov[Ri, RM ]/Var[RM ].
4the covariance between the product market shock and the market return multiplied by the
standard deviation of firm i’s profit. Not only is this the first time that the Cov[Ri, RM ]
has been expressed in terms of the standard deviation of a firm’s profit but this formulation
adds a considerable amount of tractability. To determine how the Cov[Ri, RM ] changes
with some parameters, such as concentration, I only need to understand how the parameter
affects the standard deviation of a firm’s profit because the covariance between the market
return and the product market shock is exogenous. Finally, I am also the first to write the
share price in terms of the expectation and standard deviation of firm i’s profit.
I chose to study industry concentration because aside from the above two conflicting
theoretical results, the previous work on industry concentration has been contradictory and
mostly empirical. The empirical work supports the three contradictory conclusions that in-
creasing industry concentration decreases, increases, and does not affect a stock’s expected
returns. In support of the first conclusion, Hou and Robinson [31] estimate that firms in the
quintile of the most competitive industries have returns nearly four percent greater than
firms in the most concentrated quintile.7 These authors argue that competitive industries
are riskier because they are more likely to face change from innovation, Schumpeter’s cre-
ative destruction, and that they are more sensitive to demand shocks due to lower barriers
to entry. However, they do not provide a formal model that links these arguments to their
econometric work, and they do not look at share prices.
In contrast, Lustgarten and Thomadakis [44] and Melicher, Rush, and Winn [48] support
the other two conclusions. Lustgarten and Thomadakis found that announced changes in
a firm’s accounting earnings led to a greater change in the market capitalization in more
concentrated industries. If future prices are treated as exogenous, this weakly implies that
the stock returns increased with concentration. Finally, Melicher, Rush, and Winn look
at 495 manufacturing firms and find that industry concentration has no effect on a stock
return.
Using the Hotelling and the Cournot model, this chapter will provide theoretical exam-
ples of how the standard deviation of profit, the market capitalization, and the expected
return approximately change with N when there are different sources of uncertainty. First,
the standard deviation of profit decreases in N except in the case of a Cournot firm is facing
7This additional rate of return is considerable, because Mehra and Prescott [47] estimated the equity
premium to be roughly six percent.
5a shock to costs. The market capitalization always decreases in N for sufficiently small
shocks. Finally, the expected return either increases in or is independent of N, except in the
case of a Hotelling firm with a relatively large market share facing a shock to the intensity of
product differentiation. The expected return increases in N when firms face shocks to costs,
when a Hotelling firm with a relatively small market share is facing a shock to the intensity
of product differentiation, and when a Cournot firm is facing a shock to the slope of the
demand function. The expected return is independent of N when the shock simply rescales
the profit function, when there is a monopoly, and when there are perfectly competitive
firms.
This chapter will be divided into three main sections. The first section will incorporate
an equilibrium theory of the firm from industrial organization into CAPM. The second
section will use the Hotelling model of firm behavior to study how industry concentration
affects a firm’s market capitalization and systematic risk. Finally, the third section uses a
Cournot and competitive model to study how industry concentration affects these financial
outcomes.
1.2 The Model
Firm i has a C2 profit function of the form, pii(τi, N,X). τi is an exogenous collection of
firm and industry characteristics, such as a firm’s cost function or the amount of product
differentiation in the industry. The term, N, is also an exogenous parameter. To study
the effect of industry concentration, N is the number of firms in the industry. However,
the theory is general enough for N to represent any firm characteristic. Finally, there is
an exogenous local random shock, X, to any of the elements in τi. This will be known as
the product market risk. Depending on which element in τi is affected, the shock can be
understood as either a firm specific or an industry wide shock.
There are two sets of exogenous random variables, the product market shock, X, and
the market rate of return, RM . The market return is an unknown function of the product
market shock, which means that X and RM have an exogenous covariance. For example, if
X is a shock to the price of oil, then the model takes the covariance of oil with the market
return as given. Because I am combining a competitive model of the security market, in
which firms are price takers, with an imperfect model of industry competition, I assume
6that a firm is non-infinitesimal relative to an industry, but it is infinitesimal relative to the
market. Therefore, I assume that firm behavior in the product market does not affect the
market return.
This is a one-period model with the shocks to profit occurring in the middle of the
period. At the beginning of the period, one share of each firm is sold at price pio. The price
is derived from the financial market’s belief about the expectation and standard deviation
of the firm’s profit at the end of the period. Before the shock is realized, the profit function
is deterministic. Next, the product market shock and the market return are realised. Firms
have perfect knowledge of the product market shock and its affect on the other firms.
Therefore, this is a model of perfect information. Firms then play a game and re optimize
their profits, unconcerned about how their actions affect the financial market. Next, profits
are realized. At the end of the period, all profit is returned to the shareholders as dividends
and the stock becomes worthless.
Conceptually, this models argues that at the beginning of the period, investors know
what the firm’s profit is, they know what elements in τi will be shocked, and they know the
expectation and the standard deviation of the product market shock. They also know what
the covariance between the product market shock and the market return is. Similar to the
orignanl CAPM assumption, they all agree on this knowledge. Since investors do not know
what the realization of the shock will be, they do no know what profit will be at the end
of the period. Therefore, they use the expectation and standard deviation of firm profit,
among the other factors, to determine the equilibrium stock prices and expected returns.
My method for adding local random shocks to profit is based on Pratt (1964)’s first order
approach to characterizing the effect of a small amount of uncertainty on utility functions.
However, I characterize the effect of a small amount of product market risk on firm profit.
Profit is a function of k independent shocks. The shocks are represented by the variables,
X1, ..., Xk, where each Xk is a random variable with E[Xk] = X0 and Var[Xk] = ν2k . Let
X be the vector of shocks. Local shocks add uncertainty without any assumption about
the exact distributions of the random variables. For example, if the future price of oil is
uncertain, then investors price shares based on their expectation and standard deviation of
the price of oil. However, this method only results in approximations which become more
accurate with smaller shocks.
Profit at the end of the period is approximated by a Taylor series with respect to X at
7the point X = X0. Similar to Pratt, I use a two term Taylor Series where I ignore all terms
with Xs s.t. s ≥ 2. Throughout this model, I will ignore any terms that arise with Xs st.
s ≥ 2. The Taylor Series approximation is
pii(τi, N,X) ≈ pii(., X0) +
k∑
l=1
(Xl −X0)
[
dpii(.)
dXl
]
Xl=X0
.
For future ease, I will use the following notation even though it obscures the fact that all
derivatives in this equation are taken with respect to Xl and then the X1 is set to its mean
of X0 within these functions.
pii(τi, N,X) ≈ pii(., X0) +
k∑
l=1
(Xl −X0)pi′i(., X0). (1.1)
The profit function evaluated at X = X0 is simply profit at the beginning of the period and
it is deterministic. The derivatives of profit evaluated at X = X0 are also deterministic and
can be understood as functions of the primitives of profit at the beginning of the period.
Therefore, the Taylor Series approximation estimates a firm’s profit at the end of the period
by profit at the beginning of the period plus product market risk multiplied by roughly how
profit changes with that risk.
A Taylor Series Approximation yields simple formulations of the expectation and stan-
dard deviation of profit. They are
EX [pii(τi, N,X)] ≈ EX
[
pii(., X0) +
k∑
l=1
(Xl −X0)pi′i(., 0)
]
= pii(., X0) (1.2)
SDX [pii(τi, N,X)] ≈
√√√√ k∑
l=1
ν2l
[
dpii(.)
dXl
]2
X=X0
=
√√√√ k∑
l=1
ν2l pi
′
i(., 0)2. (1.3)
The derivation of equation (1.3) is given in full in Claim (i) of the Appendix. The standard
deviation of profit is roughly the sum of the product market risks multiplied by how profit
changes with each risk. The trade-off between the expectation and the standard deviation
of profit, and how this changes with respect to N drives the results in this model.
So far, I have discussed characteristics of a firm’s profit without any mention of a financial
market. In the CAPM equilibrium, all stocks must lie on the security market line, which
8represents the financial market. Let µ ≡ σM−1(E[RM ] − Rf ) be the Sharpe Ratio, which
is a dimensionless measure of the reward for a unit of market risk. The standard CAPM
valuation formula for any cash flow EX [pi(τi, N,X)] is
po
i =
1
Rf
(
EX [pii(τi, N,X)]− µCov[pii(τi, N,X), RM ]
)
. (1.4)
Clearly, the valuation formula can provide a direct link between the financial market and
an equilibrium outcome of firm behavior. However, to understand how Beta changes with
N, I need to overcome the endogeneity problem Cov[pii(τi, N,X)/poi, RM ].
To endogenize the covariance, I first construct two orthogonal decompositions of RM .
The first decomposition is for the simpler case of one product market shock, X1. The other
more complicated decomposition is for the case of k independent shocks, X1, ..., Xk. In the
former case, I can use the standard orthogonal projection formula to decompose the market
return into
RM = θ1X1 + Y1,
where θ1 = Cov[RM , X1]/Var[X1], and Y1 is the part of RM uncorrelated with X1. If X1
is an oil shock, then θ1 captures how the price of oil moves with the market return. When
there are k shocks, the market return is decomposed into
RM = θk
k∑
i=1
Xi
νi
+ Yk,
where θk = Cov[
∑k
l=1
Xl
νl
, RM ]/Var[
∑k
l=1
Xl
νl
]. Weighting each shock by its standard devia-
tion greatly assists future tractability.
I then calculate the covariance using the appropriate orthogonal decomposition of RM
and the approximation of profit given in equation (1.1). Without loss of generality, let
[dpi(.)/dXl]Xl=X0 ≥ 0 ∀l = 1, ..., k. In the case of one product market shock,
Cov[pii(τi, N,X1), RM ] ≈ Cov[X1, RM ]
SD[X1]
SDX1 [pii(τi, N,X1)]. (1.5)
See Claim (ii) in the Appendix. Conceptually, this model argues that the covariance between
firm profit and the market return can be approximated by the way the product market
9shock moves with the market return times how the firm is affected by the product market
shock. This approximation overcomes the endogeneity problem because the fraction is only
a function of exogenous random variables and the standard deviation of profit depends on
the exogenous parameters, τi, N, and X1.
In the case of k independent product market shocks, the covariance approximation is
more complicated and depends on two assumptions. The first assumption is that Cov[Xl, Y ]
= 0, ∀l = 1, ..., k. For tractability I assume that the [dpi(.)/dXl]Xl=X0 are pairwise scalar
multiples. Conceptually, this requires the shocks to affect the profit function in a fairly
similar way. The resulting covariance is
Cov[pii(., X), RM ] ≈
[
Cov[
∑k
l=1
Xl
νl
, RM ]
Var[
∑k
l=1
Xl
νl
]
]∑kl=1
√
ν2l η
2
l√∑k
l=1 ν
2
l η
2
l
SDX [pii(., X)]. (1.6)
See Claim (iii) in the Appendix. In this case, the covariance between firm profit and the
market return can be approximated by the standard deviation of profit times two fractions.
The first fraction captures how the market return moves with the product market shocks
and the second fraction re-weighs how much the profit function is affected by each shock.
Once again, these two fractions are completely exogenous to the model.
Next, I rewrite the equilibrium share price in (1.4) using the appropriate covariance.
Let ρ be a constant which equals the exogenous terms in the above covariances. Therefore,
ρ =

Cov[Xl,RM ]
SD[Xl]
if l = 1
[
Cov[
∑k
l=1
Xl
νl
,RM ]
Var[
∑k
l=1
Xl
νl
]
][∑k
l=1
√
ν2l η
2
l√∑k
l=1 ν
2
l η
2
l
]
if l finite and l independent.
(1.7)
The top ρ applies in the case of one product market shock and the bottom ρ in the case of
a finite number of independent shocks. The new share price is
po
i =
1
Rf
(
EX [pii(τi, N,X)]− µρSDX [pii(τi, N,X)]
)
. (1.8)
This is the first time the CAPM valuation formula has been expressed in terms of the
expectation and standard deviation of the risky cash flow. This formula argues that security
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pricing is determined by a trade off between the expectation and a weighted version of the
standard deviation of firm profit, where the weights are determined by the reward for holding
market risk, µ, and roughly how the product market risk co-varies with the market return,
ρ.
I can now determine how the equilibrium share price and the expected return change
with the number of firms in the industry. The derivative of the share price is
dpio
dN
=
1
Rf
[
dEX [pii(τi, N,X)]
dN
− µρdSDX [pii(τi, N,X)]
dN
]
. (1.9)
Once again, because ρ is exogenously determined, it is independent of N . The behavior of
this is determined by how the trade off between the expectation and the standard deviation
of profit is affected by N . The derivative of the expected return is
dE[Ri]
dN
=
ρµ
Rf (pio)
2
[
EX [pi(.)]
dSDX [pi(.)]
dN
− SDX [pi(.)]dEX [pi(.)]
dN
]
. (1.10)
I show the derivation in Claim (iv) of the Appendix. This derivative is written in terms of
two distinct groups of terms. The first group is a fraction of only financial variables and the
second group, in the bracketed term, solely captures the product market effects. The only
role the financial variables have in equation (1.10) is to provide an exogenously determined
positive or a negative weight to the bracketed term. Therefore, understanding how N affects
the expected return reduces to determining the net result of the product market effects.
An interesting way to interpret these product market effects is to multiply (1.10) by the
fraction EX [pi(.)]2/EX [pi(.)]2. This allows the derivative to be rewritten as
dE[Ri]
dN
≈ ρµEX [pi(.)]
2
Rf (pio)
2
d
dN
[
SDX [pii(., N,X)]
EX [pii(., N,X)]
]
. (1.11)
The sign of the first fraction is determined by ρ. The ratio of the standard deviation to
the expectation of profit can be considered as a measure of firm risk where a risker firm
has more uncertainty per unit of expected profit. This measure of firm risk fits works well
with the mean variance framework of the CAPM. A share’s expected return increases in N
when the standard deviation per unit of expected profit increases in N . Therefore, equation
(1.11) captures the intuition that riskier investments have higher expected returns.
To study how industry concentration affects share prices and expected returns, I need
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to specify how the profit function depends on X and N . I will now use the two theories of
the firm from industrial organization with this extended version of the CAPM.
1.3 Hotelling Model
In this section, I test the effect of concentration when firm behavior is represented by
the Hotelling circular city model.8 In this extension of the CAPM, firms have perfect
information about the realization of the product market shock. Based on this knowledge,
the firms simultaneously choose prices to maximize profits.
In the basic set up, N firms are located symmetrically around a circle of circumference
1. The circle represents a unidimensional space of product differentiation and each firm’s
location indicates the characteristic of its product. The number of firms is determined
exogenously and after an entry or exit, the firms reestablish a symmetric distance from
each other. For simplicity, N will be treated as a continuous variable. In this model, profit
is always weakly decreasing in N .9
Demand in this market is represented by a continuum of consumers around the circle
with a uniform density of m. Let t ≥ 0 be the linear disutility of consuming the wrong
product. All firms will face the same t. In equilibrium, for t > 0, consumers located close to
a firm (and therefore consuming close to their ideal one) pay higher prices and consumers
located further away tend to pay lower ones.
The profit function in this model is determined by the convention that each firm only
directly competes with its immediate neighbors. Each firm is still affected by the number of
firms in the market, but only indirectly through the distance between each firm. Let ci be
each firm’s constant marginal cost. In this study, I will only examine the cases where each
firm still earns weakly positive profits after the shock and after the change in N. Therefore,
firm i’s profit is pii(τi, N,X) where τi = {ci, ci+1, ci−1, t,m}, with cN+1 = c1 and c0 = cN .
The distribution of profit is determined by a firm’s market share (number of consumers)
and the price markup (price-cost margin) charged to each consumer. The only way to
change the distribution of profit among the firms is to change the distribution of costs or
8A good recent work using this model under uncertainty is Raith [52]’s study of product market compe-
tition and the provision of managerial incentives.
9The speed at which firms can reestablish themselves around the circle depends on the exact characteristic
of differentiation. Departure time or product color may be examples of product differentiation that are
relatively quicker for a firm to change.
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t. Due to the uniform density of consumers, a change in m only affects the absolute profit
of each firm but not the relative profit. Except for the case when firms have symmetric
costs, the firms have both different market shares. Therefore they are not symmetric. As t
decreases, the products are perceived to be more substitutable, and prices along with profits
fall. Also for a given t, pii always decreases in ci.
I consider four different shocks to the parameters in τi. Without much loss of generality,
all shocks are additive, even though the structure of uncertainty from section 1.2 allows for
more general formulations. I first analyze a correlated shock to firm costs calculated by
pii(ci + αiX, ci+1 + αi+1X, ci−1 + αi−1, .) where αi ∈ R ∀i. In this case, each firm receives
the same shock, but the αi term allows each firm to have a different sensitivity. If the αi
are all the same, then each firm’s profit is the same after the shock and the effect of the
shock washes out. Secondly, I consider an independent shock to cost, which is formulated
as pii(ci +Xi, ci+1 +Xi+1, ci−1 +Xi−1, .) so that each firm receives a different shock to its
costs. Next, the shock to t, t+X, simply changes how substitutable the consumers perceive
the products to be. Finally, I consider a shock to demand, m +X, which also washes out
because the uniform density of consumers makes a shock to demand increase each firm’s
profit by the same amount.
Before analyzing how the number of firms affects share prices and expected returns with
each shock, I analyze the the sign of dSDX [pii(X,N)]/dN with each shock because it plays
a critical role in the sign of the above derivatives and there is very little theoretical work
studying it.10 The derivative of SDX [pii(., X)] with respect to N is weakly negative for all
of the shocks. The exact formulas for each of the derivatives are listed in the Appendix
under Claims (vi)-(ix). Regardless of the source of uncertainty, firms in more competitive
industries have a lower standard deviation of profits than firms in more concentrated indus-
tries. This result is fairly intuitive because, as N increases, q decreases in this model and
it is not surprising that firm that produce less have a smaller standard deviation of profits.
10Raith [52], whose work is based on a similar circular city model, also looks at how the variance of
profit changes when the degree of competition among firms changes. However, there are some substantial
differences between our models. In his model, N is endogenous and he assumes free entry with a fixed
entry cost, F . Secondly, Raith considers a normally distributed and independent additive shock to each
firm’s cost function. Finally, he assumes that each firm’s realized cost is private information and that firms
maximize profit over the expectations they have about each other’s costs. Raith finds that the variance
increases as the products become more substitutable (t decreases), m increases, and F increases. While the
differences between our models make the results incomparable in many important ways, both models uphold
the relationship dSDX [pii(X,N)]/dq > 0. In Raith, q increases in product substitutability, market size, and
the entry cost and in my model, q decreases in N.
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The following table summarizes how the standard deviation of profit, the share price,
and the expected return change with N when there are different sources of uncertainty.
Table 1.1: Hotelling Model
Correlated Costs Indep. Costs Shock to t Shock to m
dSDX [pii]/dN / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0
dpio/dN / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0
dE[Ri]/dN ' 0 ' 0 u ci − 12(ci−1 + ci+1) u 0
The derivations are listed in the Appendix under Claims (vi)-(ix). The results for dpio/dN
only hold for sufficiently small shock. All the other results in Table 1.1 are global, i.e., they
hold for any size shock. Market capitalization decreases in the number of firms when X
is sufficiently small. This is because in equation (1.8), dE[pii]/dN ≤ 0, and, as discussed
above, −dSDX [pii]/dN ≥ 0 for all types of shocks. However, when X is sufficiently small,
−dSDX [pii]/dN is dominated by dE[pii]/dN .
In contrast to the share price, the sign of the derivative of the expected return depends
on the shock. In the two cases where there are correlated and independent shocks to costs,
a firm’s expected return increases in the number of firms. This result holds regardless of the
distribution of the costs or how sensitive each firm is to the shock (through the αi term).
Equation (1.11) provides the intuition that the standard deviation of profit per unit of profit
increases in N. Because both the standard deviation of profit and profit decrease in N , this
means that the standard deviation of profit decreases at a slower rate than profit for these
two shocks to cost.
In the case of a shock to t, the derivative of the expected return is determined by the
distribution of costs. Clearly, dE[Ri]/dN ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ ci ≥ 12(ci−1 + ci+1). For a fixed t,
a relatively higher cost translates into a relatively smaller market share. Therefore, the
expected return of firm with a relatively smaller market share, facing a shock to t, increases
in N . Equation (1.11) provides the intuition that the standard deviation of profit per unit
of profit increases in N for relatively smaller firms and decreases in N for relatively larger
firms.
The expected return is also approximately independent of the number of firms in many
different situations. The first case applies to all the shocks and occurs when N → ∞ and
pii → 0. The second case only occurs when there are correlated shocks to cost and when
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each firm has the same sensitivity to the shock (when the αi terms are equal). This shock
does not even affect the absolute profit levels of the firms and so the SDX [pii] is 0. The
next case occurs when there are both kinds of shocks to costs, when the costs are equal,
and there is no product differentiation, i.e., t = 0. This captures a symmetric Bertrand
competition. The derivative of the expected return equals 0 because the firms earn zero
profit in this model of perfect competition. In the case of a shock to t, the derivative will
be approximately 0 when the firms are symmetric. Finally, in the case of a shock to m, the
derivative of the expected return is always approximately 0. Due to the uniform density
of consumers, this shock affects the absolute profit level of each firm but not the relative
profit. Therefore, this shock simply rescales the profit function.
1.4 Cournot Model
In this section, I study the impact of industry concentration when firms behave according to
a symmetric Cournot and competitive model. Firms face a linear inverse demand function,
P (Q) = a − bQ and have the constant industry cost function C(q) = c2Nq2, where all
constants are strictly positive. In this case, I examine three different shocks. There are two
additive demand shocks, a+X and b+X, along with an additive shock to costs, c+X.
The following table summarizes the results.11
Table 1.2: Cournot and Competitive Models
Shock to a Shock to b Shock to c
Comp. Cour. Comp. Cour. Comp. Cour.
dSDX [pii(.)]/dN / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 u ξ(b, c,N)
dpio/dN∗ / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0
dE[Ri]/dN u 0 u 0 u 0 u 0, N = 1 u 0 u 0, N = 1
' 0, N > 1 ' 0, N > 1
Once again, the results for dpio/dN only hold for a sufficiently small shock X, while the
other results in Table 1.4 hold globally. The standard deviation of profit decreases with the
number of firms, except when there is a supply shock to a Cournot firm. In this last case,
the sign depends on ξ(b, c,N) = N2(c2 − b2) + b2(8N − 3) + 4bcN . The share price always
decreases with the number of firms for sufficiently small shocks for the same reason as given
11The derivations for these results can be found in Panattoni (2005 - available by request).
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in the previous section. The expected return is approximately independent of the number
of firms in almost all of the cases. This result is not surprising in the case of a shock to a
because this shock simply rescales the profit function (like the shock to m in the previous
section). However, in the case of a shock to b or c for a perfectly competitive firms because
although these firms price at marginal cost, they still earn a positive profit until N → ∞.
Finally, this result also holds in the case of a shock to b or c for a monopoly. The only time
the expected share return changes with N is in a Cournot industry facing uncertainty in
the slope of the demand function or the cost function. Once again, equation (1.11) provides
the intuition that the ratio of the standard deviation of profit per unit of profit increases in
N for these two cases.
1.5 Conclusion
The objective of this article is to theoretically investigate how industry concentration af-
fects a firm’s market capitalization and expected return. To pursue this question, I extend
the CAPM by incorporating an equilibrium theory of firm behavior. Unlike previous work,
I add local product market shocks to a general, deterministic profit function. Therefore,
this method is compatible with many deterministic theories of the firm from industrial
organization and the product market uncertainty can come from many different sources.
Secondly, my method relies on an orthogonal decomposition of market returns to endo-
genize the Cov[Ri, RM ] or βi. This provides a new and more tractable interpretation of
the Cov[Ri, RM ] in terms of the standard deviation of firm profit and allows the market
capitalization to be rewritten in terms of the expectation and standard deviation of firm
profit.
Using the Hotelling and the Cournot model, I explore how the standard deviation of
profit, the market capitalization, and the expected return change with concentration when
there are different sources of uncertainty. Using the number of firms as a proxy for concen-
tration, I find that the standard deviation of profit decreases in N except in the case of a
Cournot firm facing uncertain costs. The market capitalization always decreases in N for
sufficiently small shocks. Finally, the expected return either increases in or is independent
of N , except in the case of a Hotelling firm with a relatively large market share facing a
shock to the intensity of product differentiation. The expected return increases in N when
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firms face uncertain costs, when a Hotelling firm with a relatively small market share is
facing a shock to the intensity of product differentiation, and when a Cournot firm is fac-
ing a shock to the slope of demand. The expected return is independent of N when the
shock simply rescales the profit function, when the firm is a monopoly, and when there are
perfectly competitive firms.
The relationship between this chapter’s results and Hou and Robinson’s work [31] raises
some interesting questions. After controlling size, book-to-market, momentum, and other
factors, Hou and Robinson find that a firm’s expected return increases as the industry
becomes more competitive. However, their empirical work is based on the argument that
industry concentration does not affect expected returns through the Beta term. While
this chapter provides many theoretical examples of when Beta is independent of N , it also
provides many cases where Beta increases in N. Hou and Robinson create five concentration
sorted portfolios and find that the average Beta is roughly constant across them. However,
this is not a clean test of how industry concentration affects systematic risk. Also, Hou and
Robinson run a simple regression of industry concentration on Beta in Table II and find a
statistically significant result.
A better understanding of the relationship between industry concentration and stock
returns may also help explain some other questions in finance. Irvine and Pontiff [33]
find that the volatility of the average stock return has drastically outpaced total market
volatility. They estimate idiosyncratic return volatility has increased to 6 percent per
year. However, they argue this is due to industry turnover, and they do not consider a
change in concentration. Also, although Banz’s small stock effect has been explained by
various factors such as the January effect, the relationship between a firm’s absolute size,
its relative size, industry concentration, and stock returns is largely unexplored. Finally,
a better understanding of the relationship between concentration and asset pricing could
help determine how regulating industry concentration may have important consequences
for financial markets.
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1.6 Appendix
Claim i: VarX [pi(X1, ..., Xk)] ≈
∑k
l=1 ν
2
l
[
dpi
dXl
]2
Xl=X0
Proof of Claim i:
VarX [pii(X1, ..., Xk)] = EX
[
(pii(X1, ..., Xk)− EX [pii(X1, ..., Xk)])2
]
≈ EX
[(∑k
l=1(Xl −X0)pi′i(., X0)
)2]
=
∑k
l=1EX
[
(Xl −X0)2
]
pi′i(., X0)
2
=
∑k
l=1 ν
2
l pi
′
i(., X0)
2 (By independence)
Claim ii: Cov[pii(τi, N,X1), RM ] ≈ Cov[X1,RM ]SD[X1] SDX1 [pii(τi, N,X1)]
Proof of Claim ii:
Cov[pii(τi, N,X1), RM ] = Cov[pii(τi, N,X1), θ1X1 + Y1]
= θ1EX1 [X1pii(., X1)]− θ1EX1 [pii(., X1)]EX1 [X1] (decomposition of RM )
≈ θ1EX1 [X1{pii(., X0) + (X1 −X0)pi′i(., 0)}]− θ1X0EX1 [pii(., X0)]
= θ1EX1 [
(
X21 −X20
)
pi′i(., X0)]
= θ1ν21pi
′
i(., X0)
= Cov[X1,RM ]Var[X1] ν1SDX1 [pii(τi, N,X1)]
= Cov[X1,RM ]SD[X1] SDX1 [pii(τi, N,X1)]
Claim iii: If (i) Cov[Xl, Yk] = 0 ∀l = 1, ..., k, and (ii)
[
dpi
dXl
]
X1=X0
are all scalar multiples,
i.e. ∃ z and ηl ∈ R s.t.
[
dpi
dXl
]
X1=X0
= ηlz ∀ l=1,...,k, then
Cov[pii(., X), RM ] ≈
[
Cov[
∑k
l=1
Xl
νl
, RM ]
Var[
∑k
l=1
Xl
νl
]
]∑kl=1
√
ν2l η
2
l√∑k
l=1 ν
2
l η
2
l
SDX [pi(., X)].
Proof of Claim iii:
Cov[pii(., X1, ..., Xk), RM ] = Cov[pii(., X1, ..., Xk), θk
(∑k
l=1
Xl
νl
)
+ Yk]
= Cov[pii(., X1, ..., Xk), θk
(∑k
l=1
Xl
νl
)
] (by assumption (i))
≈ Cov[pii(., X0) +
∑k
l=1 (Xl −X0)pi′(., X0), θk
∑k
l=1
Xl
νl
]
= θkCov[
∑k
n=1 (Xn −X0)pi′(., X0),
∑k
l=1
Xl
νl
]
= θk
∑k
n=1
∑k
l=1
1
νl
[
dpi
dXn
]
Xn=X0
Cov[Xn, Xl]
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= θk
∑k
l=1 νl
[
dpi
dXl
]
Xl=X0
(Xl are independent and variance equals ν2l )
= θk
(∑k
l=1
√
ν2l pi
′(., 0)2/
√∑k
l=1 ν
2
l pi
′(., 0)2
)√∑k
l=1 ν
2
l pi
′(., 0)2
= θk
(∑k
l=1
√
ν2l η
2
l z
2/
√∑k
l=1 ν
2
l η
2
l z
2
)
SDX [pii(., X)] (Assumption ii)
= θk
(∑k
l=1
√
ν2l η
2
l /
√∑k
l=1 ν
2
l η
2
l
)
SDX [pii(., X)]
=
[
Cov[
∑k
l=1
Xl
νl
,RM ]
Var[
∑k
l=1
Xl
νl
]
][∑k
l=1
√
ν2l η
2
l√∑k
l=1 ν
2
l η
2
l
]
SDX [pii(., X)]
Claim iv: dE[R
i]
dN ≈ ρµRf (pio)2
[
pii(X0, N)
dSDX [pii(X,N)]
dN − SDX [pii(X,N)]dpii(X0,N)dN
]
Proof of Claim iv:
Accounting identity: E[Ri] ≡ E[pii]/pio ⇒ dE[Ri]dN = 1(pio)2
(
pio
dE[pii]
dN − E[pii]dp
i
o
dN
)
= 1
Rf (pio)
2
[{
pii(X0)− ρµ
√∑k
l=1 ν
2
l pi
′
i(0)2
}{
dpii(X0)
dN
}
−
{
dpii(X0)
dN − ρµ
√∑k
l=1 ν
2
l
dpi′i(X0)2
dN
}
{pii(X0)}
]
= 1
Rf (pio)
2
[
−ρµ
√∑k
l=1 ν
2
l pi
′
i(0)2
dpii(X0)
dN + ρµ
√∑k
l=1 ν
2
l
dpi′i(X0)2
dN pii(X0)
]
= ρµ
Rf (pio)
2
[
EX [pii(X,N)]
dSDX [pi(X,N)]
dN − SDX [pii(X,N)]dEX [pii(X,N)]dN
]
Claim v: pii(0) = m4t [−2ci + ci−1 + ci+1 + 2tN ]2
Proof of Claim v:
Let hi(x) = ci+tx, hi−1(x) = ci−1+t(x+1/N), gi(x) = ci−tx, gi+1(x) = ci+1−t(x−1/N),
xi be the intersection between hi(x) and gi+1(x), xi−1 be the intersection between gi(x) and
hi−1(x), and zi−1 be the intersection between gi+1(x) and hi−1(x).
Then xi =
ci+1−ci
2t +
1
2n , and pii ≥ 0 ⇒ 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1/N ; similarly xi−1 = ci−ci−12t − 12n , and
pii ≥ 0⇒ −1/N ≤ xi−1 ≤ 0. Finally zi = ci+1−ci−12t , and pii ≥ 0⇒ xi−1 ≤ zi ≤ xi.
Thus, pii(0) = m
∫ zi
xi−1 gi+1(x)dx + m
∫ xi
zi
hi−1(x)dx − m
∫ 0
xi−1 gi(x)dx − m
∫ xi
0 hi(x)dx =
m
4t [−2ci + ci−1 + ci+1 + 2tN ]2.
Lemma 1: −2Nci +Nci−1 +Nci+1 + 2t ≥ 0
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Proof of Lemma 1:
−2Nci +Nci−1 +Nci+1 + 2t = tN
[−2ci + ci−1 + ci+1
t
+
2
N
]
= tN
[(
ci+1 − ci
t
+
1
N
)
−
(
ci − ci−1
t
− 1
N
)]
= tN [
1
2
xi − 12xi−1] ≥ 0 (Claim vi)
Lemma 2: 2ci − ci−1 − ci+1 + 2tN ≥ 0
Proof of Lemma 2:
2ci − ci−1 − ci+1 + 2t
N
= 2t
(
ci − ci−1
2t
− ci+1 − ci
2t
+
1
N
)
= 2t(xi−1 − xi + 2
N
)
≥ 0 (Claim vi)
Claim vi: For perfectly correlated shocks to cost,
dE[Ri]
dN
≈ ρIµν1
Rf (pio)
2
| − 2αi + αi−1 + αi+1|(−2Nci +Nci−1 +Nci+1 + 2t)2
4tN4
≥ 0.
Proof of Claim vi:
Let αi ∈ R, ∀i ∈ 1, 2, ..., N . Then
pii(X1) =
m
4t
[−2(ci + αiX1) + (ci−1 + αi−1X1) + (ci+1 + αi+1X1) + 2t
n
]2.
Therefore
pii(X0 = 0) =
m
4t
[−2ci + ci−1 + ci+1 + 2t
N
]2 ≥ 0
dpii(X0 = 0)
dN
=
m
N3
[2Nci −Nci−1 −Nci+1 − 2t] ≤ 0 (by Lemma 1)
SD[pii(X1)] =
mν1
2Nt
| − 2αi + αi−1 + αi+1|(−2Nci +Nci−1 +Nci+1 + 2t) ≥ 0.
Since
|pi′i(X0)| = |
mν1
2Nt
(−2αi + αi−1 + αi+1)(−2Nci +Nci−1 +Nci+1 + 2t)|,
it follows that
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dSD[pii(X1)]
dN
=
−mν1| − 2αi + αi−1 + αi+1|
N2
≤ 0.
Therefore
dE[Ri]
dN
≈ mρIµ
Rf (pio)
2
[
pi(0)
dSD[pii(X1)]
dN
− SD[pii(X1)]dpi(0)
dN
]
≈ mρIµν1
Rf (pio)
2
| − 2αi + αi−1 + αi+1|(−2Nci +Nci−1 +Nci+1 + 2t)2
4tN4
≥ 0.
Claim vii: For independent or idiosyncratic shocks to cost,
dE[Ri]
dN
≈ ρIµm
√
ν21 + ν
2
2 + ν
2
3
Rf (pio)
2
(−2Nci +Nci−1 +Nci+1 + 2t)2
4tN2
≥ 0
Proof of Claim vii:
pii(X1, X2, X3) =
m
4t
[−2(ci +X1) + (ci−1 +X2) + (ci+1 +X3) + 2t
n
]2
This implies
pii(X0) =
m
4t
[−2ci + ci−1 + ci+1 + 2t
N
]2 ≥ 0
dpii(X0)
dN
=
m
N3
[2Nci −Nci−1 −Nci+1 − 2t] ≤ 0 (by Lemma 1)
SD[pii(X1, X2, X3)] =
m
2t
(−2ci + ci−1 + ci+1 + 2t
N
)
√
ν21 + ν
2
2 + ν
2
3 ≥ 0
dSD[pii(X1, X2, X3)]
dN
=
−m
N2
√
ν21 + ν
2
2 + ν
2
3 ≤ 0.
Therefore
dE[Ri]
dN
≈ mρIµ
Rf (pio)
2
[
pii(X0)
dSDX [pii(X)]
dN
− SDX [pii(X)]dpii(X0)
dN
]
≈ mρIµ
√
ν21 + ν
2
2 + ν
2
3
Rf (pio)
2
(−2Nci +Nci−1 +Nci+1 + 2t)2
4tN2
≥ 0
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Claim viii: For a shock to the parameter of product differientation, t,
dE[Ri]
dN
≈ mρIµν1
Rf (pio)
2
(2ci − ci−1 − ci+1)(−2Nci +Nci−1 +Nci+1 + 2t)2
4N4t2
≥ 0⇔ ci ≥ 12(ci−1+ci+1)
Proof of Claim viii: First note
pii(X1) =
m
4(t+X1)
[−2ci + ci−1 + ci+1 + 2(t+X1)
n
]2
Thus
pii(X0 = 0) =
m
4t
[−2ci + ci−1 + ci+1 + 2t
N
]2 ≥ 0
dpii(X0)
dN
=
m
N3
[2Nci −Nci−1 −Nci+1 − 2t] ≤ 0 (Lemma 1)
SD[pii(X1)] =
mν1
4t2
(2ci − ci−1 − ci+1 + 2t
n
)(−2ci + ci−1 + ci+1 + 2t
N
) ≥ 0.
Since (−2ci + ci−1 + ci+1 + 2tN ) ≥ 0 (by Lemma 1), and (2ci − ci−1 − ci+1 + 2tN ) ≥ 0, (by
Lemma 2), it follows that
dSD[pii(X1)]
dN
=
−2m
N3
.
Thus,
dE[Ri]
dN
≈ mρIµν1
Rf (pio)
2
[
pi(0)
dSD[pii(X1)]
dN
− SD[pii(X1)]dpi(0)
dN
]
≈ mρIµν1
Rf (pio)
2
(2ci − ci−1 − ci+1)(−2Nci +Nci−1 +Nci+1 + 2t)2
4N4t2
≥ 0
⇔ ci ≥ 12(ci−1 + ci+1).
Claim ix: For a shock to demand, m, dE[R
i]
dN ≈ 0
Proof of Claim ix:
Given
pii(X1) =
m+X1
4t
[−2ci + ci−1 + ci+1 + 2t
n
]2,
we have
pii(X0) =
m
4t
[−2ci + ci−1 + ci+1 + 2t
N
]2 ≥ 0
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dpii(X0)
dN
=
m
N3
[2Nci −Nci−1 −Nci+1 − 2t] ≤ 0 (by Lemma 1)
SD[pii(X1)] =
1
4t
[−2ci + ci−1 + ci+1 + 2t
N
]2 ≥ 0
dSD[pii(X1)]
dN
=
1
N3
[2Nci −Nci−1 −Nci+1 − 2t].
Therefore dE[R
i]
dN ≈ 0 .
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Chapter 2
‘Paragraph IV’ Litigation and the
Value of Marketing Exclusivity in
the Pharmaceutical Industry
2.1 Introduction
Since the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984, the pharmaceutical industry has been regulated
according to a unique and complicated framework of patent protections and marketing
exclusivities, granted by the US Patent and Trademark Office and the FDA respectively.
The underlying goal of this regulation is to encourage firms to conduct the costly research
for new or improved drugs by granting marketing exclusivity (monopoly rights) to the
inventing firm. However, regulators face a delicate balance. Granting too much protection
hurts society through high prices on brand name drugs while too little protection can fail
to provide sufficient incentive for future drug development. Therefore, what are monopoly
rights worth to brand firms?1
Currently, the only estimates of monopoly rents are based on accounting valuations,
which exclude many additional sources of value only captured by market valuations. Ac-
counting valuations are always based on discounted cash flow (DCF) models which deter-
mine discount rates and calculate present values of profitability using drug level sales data.
However, while these estimates are highly sensitive to the measurement of drug sales and
the discount rate calculation, the critical problem is that these estimates do not include any
1It is not surprising that debate about the optimal regulation persists. For example, the Pediatric
Exclusivity, which grants an additional six months of marketing exclusivity to brand name drug firms that
test their drugs on the pediatric population, is set to expire in December of 2007 and Congress must determine
its continuance. For a list of the roughly 130 brand drugs that have been awarded the Pediatric Exclusivity
since 1997, see http://www.fda.gov/cder/pediatric/labelchange.htm#New-listings.
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of the benefits of monopoly rights to the brand firm outside of the individual drug’s sales.
One example of these potential benefits is an increased reputation that may spill over to
the brand firm’s other drugs allowing higher prices to be charged for them. Therefore, I
create the first market valuation of monopoly rents because market valuations aggregate in-
formation from many actors, not just the researcher(s) that created the DCF model. These
estimates also capture unknown yet relevant factors and they include intangible and other
benefits of monopoly rights that exist in addition to sales.
However, developing a market valuation of monopoly rents involves first overcoming the
challenges associated with estimating how horizontal industry concentration affects stock
returns.2 The previous empirical literature estimating how industry concentration affects
stock returns has used a wide variety of approaches and has produced a body of contra-
dictory of conclusions. Early work includes Melicher, Rush, and Winn [48], who found
that industry concentration have no effect on returns, and Sullivan [59], who found that
firms in more concentrated industries have lower returns. However, these papers from the
1970’s based their conclusions on the CAPM for the return generating model. Lustgarten
and Thomadakis [44] found that announced changes in a firm’s accounting earnings led to
a greater change in the market capitalization in more concentrated industries. Treating
future prices as exogenous, this weakly implies that firms in more concentrated industries
earn higher returns. These authors argue that more concentrated firms are riskier because
their capital is more durable and specialized. Most recently, Hou and Robinson [31] regress
returns on the Herfindahl index and estimate that firms in the quintile of the most competi-
tive industries have returns nearly four percent greater than firms in the most concentrated
quintile.3 These authors provide a risk-based explanation for this ‘concentration premium’.
They argue that competitive industries are riskier because they are more likely to face
change from innovation (innovation risk), or that they are more sensitive to demand shocks
due to lower barriers to entry (distress risk). However, they do not create a formal model
that links these arguments to their econometric work.
These papers all face three econometric difficulties, which may contribute to their con-
flicting results. Although regressing any function of firm profit on a measure of industry
concentration raises the specter of endogeneity, in the financial context, an efficient mar-
2Conceptually, horizontal concentration may be thought of in terms of any of the nondecreasing convex
measures of industry market shares describe in Tirole [60].
3This additional rate of return is considerable because the equity premium is estimated at six percent.
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ket creates orthogonality between the industry concentration measure and the error term.
However, endogeneity can resurface when information about industry concentration at any
period is only partially incorporated into asset prices at that period. This incomplete ad-
justment can occur because the Herfindahl index is a slow moving measure with a large lag
and therefore information about one period may not show up in the measure until many
periods later. These papers all construct the concentration measure using firm level sales
and not product level sales. Therefore, it is possible for some industries to appear highly
competitive according to the measure, while the products in the industry actually com-
pete with significant market power. Finally, in panel data sets, there is the potential for
confounding factors.
This paper exploits a natural experiment afforded by the announcement of ‘Paragraph
IV’ patent infringement decisions. These judgments have three unique features. They
constitute an exogenous change in industry concentration, since they determine whether
the corporate owner of a brand name prescription drug will maintain or lose monopoly
marketing rights. They also satisfy methodological requirements to use a short window
event study to capture how the financial market prices this change. Finally, they generate
a binomial outcome space which can be used to value marketing exclusivity. Against a
backdrop of contradictory empirical evidence, this experiment provides a clean opportunity
to empirically determine the sign of how a change in horizontal industry concentration affects
stock returns. Additionally, the magnitude of the effect provides the basis for developing
the market valuation.
The event study methodology has many advantages over the previous work estimating
how horizontal industry concentration affects stock returns. This methodology credibly
establishes that the resolution of litigation causes the change in returns. The short event
window also allows researchers to isolate the time frame when the financial market prices
change in concentration, which minimizes the potential for confounding factors to influence
the results. Finally, the intuition underlying this methodology is conceptually straightfor-
ward. Event studies usually explore hypotheses about how corporate events affect the value
of claims issued against a corporation. If the rate of return earned on a security during the
announcement of an event is more positive than normal, the conclusion is that the event
caused the value of the corporation to increase.
The presence of market expectations about trial outcomes require additional work to
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isolate the sign of the concentration effect and develop the value of marketing exclusivity.
The announcement of a ‘Paragraph IV’ decision generates a binomial outcome structure; ei-
ther brand maintains monopoly rights until patent expiration or it faces generic entry. This
binomial structure, combined with the one period state price (Arrow-Debreu) representa-
tion of the brand firm’s stock price, is used to bound the pre-decision valuation between
the two post-decision state contingent valuations. Thus the sign of the abnormal returns
uniquely identifies the post decision state. Therefore, this paper finds that returns of the
brand firm increases (decreases) with an announcement that it ‘won’ (lost) the case. This
result provides a simple and clean intra-industry example of how increasing (decreasing
concentration) increased (decreased) stock returns with the intuition that the value of the
brand firm has increased (decreased). Finally, the value of marketing exclusivity is deter-
mined to be the abnormal return given the brand maintains monopoly rights minus the
abnormal return given the brand faces generic entry.
The remainder of this paper is divided into five sections. Section 2.2 provides some
industry background, including a description of the regulatory regime under the Hatch-
Waxman Act and the structure of ‘Paragraph IV’ patent infringement cases. Section 2.3
describes the research design and methodological issues. Sections 2.4 and 2.5 describe the
data and the results respectively. Finally, the conclusion discusses possible extensions to
this study.
2.2 Industry Background
2.2.1 The Regulatory Environment and ‘Paragraph IV’ Litigation
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, commonly known
as the Hatch-Waxman Act, established the current FDA regulations for approving generic
copies of brand name drugs. One component of the Act created the abbreviated new drug
application (ANDA), which lowered the regulatory barriers to entry for generic drugs. An
ANDA enables generic manufacturers to skip most of the expensive pre-clinical and clinical
testing by allowing firms to establish bioequivalency4 to an approved drug. The Act also
4The FDA has defined bioequivalence as, “the absence of a significant difference in the rate and extent
to which the active ingredient or active moiety in pharmaceutical equivalents or pharmaceutical alternatives
becomes available at the site of drug action when administered at the same molar dose under similar
conditions in an appropriately designed study.” (http://www.fda.gov/cder/guidance/5356fnl.pdf)
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permits generic firms to conduct bioequivalency testing while the referenced patents are
still in force, without risking an infringement suit.5
The Orange Book is the FDA’s official public list of all patents and exclusivities, along
with their expiration dates, which protect a brand name drug.6 In order to receive FDA
approval, all ANDAs must certify that the proposed generic drug will not infringe upon any
referenced patent listed in the Orange Book.7 There are four different patent certifications
an ANDA may claim.
1. ‘Paragraph I Certification’ – certifies that the required patent information has not
been filed in connection to the referenced brand name drug.
2. ‘Paragraph II Certification’ – certifies that all patents listed in relation with the ref-
erenced brand name drug have expired.
3. ‘Paragraph III Certification’ – certifies that all patents have not expired and provides
the dates the referenced patents will expire.
4. ‘Paragraph IV Certification’ – The listed patent is invalid or will not be infringed by
the generic drug.
An ANDA with a ‘Paragraph I or II Certification’ may be approved by the FDA immediately,
since the patents have expired or were never listed in the Orange Book. An ANDA with
‘Paragraph III Certification’ signals the generic manufacturer’s interest in entering after
the relevant patents have expired. This ANDA may only be granted ‘tentative approval’,
as long as the bioequivalency requirements have been met, and approval is granted upon
patent expiration.8
A generic manufacturer submits a ‘Paragraph IV Patent Certification’ when it is seeking
approval to enter a market before the relevant patents have expired. The manufacturer is
5The Hatch-Waxman Act has greatly increased the volume of approved generic drugs. In 1984, only 14%
of the prescriptions were written for generic copies compared to 54% in 2005. See Ted Sherwood’s overview
of the ANDA review process at www.fda.gov/cder/audiences/iact/forum/200609 sherwood.pdf.
6This publication, formally known as ‘Approved Drug Products and Therapeutic Equivalents’, can be
found at www.fda.gov/cder/ob, and also lists all the approved brand name drugs and their respective gener-
ics, approval dates, and their approved dosages, routes of administration, and indications of usage.
7Patent laws are more pro-competitive for every other product than the FDA regulations are for drugs.
When there is a patent dispute for other products, the potentially infringing firm may enter and sell the
product until an injunction is granted. However, when the patent dispute is between pharmaceutical firms,
generics are prevented from entering by every patent regardless of its merits. (Hollis [30])
8For excellent references on patent certifications, please see FTC [21], Bulow [8], and Higgins and Ro-
driguez [29].
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claiming either that its formulation of the brand drug does not infringe upon the relevant
patents held by the brand name company, or that the original patents should never have been
granted. By filing an ANDA with ‘Paragraph IV’ certification, the generic manufacturer
triggers two additional provisions in the Hatch-Waxman Act to resolve the conflicting patent
infringement claim. The first provision is the thirty month stay. The generic manufacturer
must notify the patent holder (brand name drug company) of its application and the factual
and legal basis of its claim. The brand name firm then has forty-five days in which to file
an infringement suit or face generic entry. As Higgins and Rodriguez [29] write,
“...by filing the suit, the FDA can not grant approval until the earliest of: (1)
the date the NDA patent being challenged expires, (2) there is a lower court
ruling invalidating the patent or a decision of non-infringement, or (3) 30 months
after the patent holder was originally notified of the ‘Paragraph IV’ ANDA
certification.’ [p14]
In 2002, the FTC [21] estimated that it took approximately 25 months to resolve an in-
fringement suit, which provided the brand name company an extra two years of marketing
exclusivity.
Additional features of the regulatory environment encouraged brand name firms to list
patents in the Orange Book. The FDA’s role in listing patents in the Orange Book is solely
procedural which means that it automatically lists all patents submitted by brand name
firms. The Agency states that its function is to determine the safety and efficacy of potential
drugs and that it does not have the resources or expertise to resolve the complex questions
of patent coverage.9 Patents covering brand name drugs are granted by the US Patent and
Trademark office anytime along the development lifeline of a drug, from pre-clinical trials to
marketing. Post approval, FDA regulations allow a brand name company to list a patent in
the Orange book as long as the patent was submitted to the FDA within thirty days of the
patent’s grant.10 According to Hatch-Waxman regulations, even a generic with a pending
ANDA when additional patents are listed must re-certify to the newly listed patents.
On the other hand, the second Hatch-Waxman provision to resolve the conflicting patent
claim encourages generic manufacturers to initiate ‘Paragraph IV’ litigation. The FDA
9The Agency relies on declarations of good faith, signed by brand name firms, that submitted patents
have merit. ‘180-Day Generic Drug Exclusivity’
10Voet [61]
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writes ‘the statute provides an incentive of 180 days of market exclusivity to the ‘first’ generic
applicant who challenges a listed patent by filing a ‘substantially complete’ ‘Paragraph
IV Certification’ and runs the risk of having to defend a patent infringement suit.’ The
regulatory landscape implementing the 180 day exclusivity has had a highly contentious
and unstable history, which has continued to the present.11 In the presence of pending
litigation and current administrative review, the FDA had not published a final rule on the
exclusivity as of July 2007.
In conclusion, the Hatch-Waxman provision establishing ‘Paragraph IV’ patent certifi-
cations creates uncertainty about the length of exclusive marketing for brand name firms.
On one hand, exclusive marketing can be extended beyond the last date of patent expira-
tion listed in the Orange Book shortly after approval. This could depend on factors such
as whether brand name firms chooses an aggressive patent listing strategy, the timing and
success of ‘later’ patents12 or the outcome of ‘Paragraph IV’ infringement suits. On the
other hand, exclusive marketing can also end earlier than anticipated if the generic man-
ufacturer can invent around the patents, establish bioequivalency, and win the ‘Paragraph
IV’ infringement suit.
2.2.2 The Structure of ‘Paragraph IV’ Litigation
For the majority of brand name drugs, the uncertainty generated by ‘Paragraph IV’
litigation is mostly resolved at the District Court level. In general, pharmaceutical patent
infringement decisions are highly uncertain events for many reasons, such as patents are
suppose to protect novel innovations, there may be minimal legal precedent directly ap-
plicable to the patents at issue or the exact way the generic potentially infringes on those
patents may be new. These cases begin in a District Court and they nearly always pro-
ceed to the Appellate Court, where they are heard by a three judge panel. However, the
Appellate Court mostly upholds the decisions of the Lower Court. Appellate cases are occa-
11According to the FTC [21], the FDA only granted this exclusivity to three generic manufacturers prior
to 1993. However, between, 1993 and 1997, the FDA did not grant this exclusivity to any generic applicants
stating that applicants must win an infringement suit against a brand name company to be eligible. These
regulations were challenged by the generic firm Mova, in Mova v. Shalala, and in April 1998, the Court
of Appeals affirmed that the FDA’s interpretation of the 180 day exclusivity was inconsistent with the
Hatch-Waxman statutes. From 1998 to 2001, the FDA granted the 180 day exclusivity to thirty-one generic
applicants.
12The US Patent and Trademark office takes between one and three years to decide a patent case (Voet
[61]).
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sionally remanded back to the lower Court for partial reconsideration but complete reversal
is rare. The Supreme Court does not hear pharmaceutical patent infringement cases where
infringement is the issue at trial.
The structure of ‘Paragraph IV’ District Court cases generates considerable uncertainty
in the outcome. Patent infringement trials are bench trials, which means they are decided
by a single judge. Once the brand drug company files the suit, the judge determines whether
the minimal legal requirements to proceed to trial have been met, sets the scope of the issues
at trial, and hears a couple of days of oral arguments. Then the judge withdraws from the
public and may announce her decision anytime within roughly the next year. After oral
arguments, she typically does not communicate with the litigants or the public until she
announces her decision.
‘Paragraph IV’ trials generate a binomial state space, either the brand wins and main-
tains marketing exclusivity or the brand firm loses and there is generic entry. If the judge
determines the brand firm’s patent is infringed by the generic’s copy, then the FDA can
not legally approve the generic version and the generic can not enter until the patent at
issue expires.13 With this decision, the brand firm is considered to have won the case
because it continues to have exclusive marketing rights until the patent expires. On the
other hand, the FDA can legally approve a generic version with a District Court decision
of non-infringement. In this case, the generic may enter the market as soon as the FDA
finishes its regulatory process (which typically takes roughly a month) and the company
can physically bring its product to market. With this simple outcome structure, the judge
is deciding whether or not the brand name firm may earn monopoly rents from roughly the
current time until the patent expires or what the industry concentration is during this time
period.
The binomial state space argument requires that the patents at issue in the case expire
at the same time. Also, the argument claims that the number of generic defendants or the
issue of validity vs. infringement does not matter for a number of reasons. Some generics
decide not to enter until after the Appellate Decision to avoid the risk of potential treble
damages. The ‘180 day exclusivity’ applies to some generics but not all. There may be
other cases with different generic defendants. The number of generic defendants about to
receive FDA approval is unknown because the FDA does not release that information. And
13Assuming no other patent issues arise.
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finally, cross licensing is prevalent among generics which means that the number of generics
who receive FDA approval is nearly always less than those which finally enter. All of these
reasons break the correlation between the number of generic defendants and the number
and timing of generic entrants.
2.3 Research Design
2.3.1 An Industry with an Exogenous Change in Concentration
Ideally, to test the effects of industry concentration on any function of firm profitability, the
researcher would randomly reassign a fixed production capacity to a different number of
owners holding everything else, such as input prices and demand, constant. Random reas-
signment ensures that estimates do not suffer from the simultaneous equations and omitted
variable biases that plague estimates of endogenous relationships. When random assign-
ment is not a viable option, an alternative approach is to rely on an industry with a gate
keeping mechanism that determines all facets of the concentration change independently of
any action by the actual and potential industry participants.
The unique regulatory environment of the pharmaceutical industry provides the key
econometric features for identifying and isolating the effects of a concentration change. The
underlying source of the exogenous change in concentration stems from generic entry due to
the brand drug’s patent expiration. Pharmaceutical products provide the cleanest example
of a change in concentration due to patent expiration because the FDA’s Orange Book
establishes an exact correspondence between patents and products. In using ‘Paragraph IV’
District Court decisions as a gate keeping mechanism, this paper takes advantage of that
established correspondence. The retail market for pharmaceutical products is also cleanly
defined. The FDA has the right to regulate all prescription and over-the-counter drugs in
the United States. Therefore, the retail market constitutes the FDA’s jurisdiction.14
Due to the bioequivalency requirement and other regulations, the FDA argues that brand
name drugs and their generics are virtually perfect substitutes differing only in name. A
brand name drug is any molecule that has had a new drug application (NDA) approved by
14This is an uncontroversial definition of the retail market compared to, for example, to work done on
retail gasoline where a single station’s market has been defined as both the set of stations within a one mile
of street distance from the original station (Hastings [28]) and the set of stations along each consumer’s
commuting path (Houde [32]).
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the FDA. A brand name drug only receives approval for specific dosages, routes of admin-
istration, and indications of usage15 and it is only sold under a proprietary name agreed
upon by the FDA. A generic version of a brand name drug has the same active ingredients,
route of administration, dosage form, strength and indications of usage. Furthermore, the
inactive ingredients must have been previously approved in a similar NDA. Formally, a
generic drug must establish its bioequivalence to a brand name drug (Voet [61]). Generics
may only be identified by the molecule’s chemical name16, and generics must also have the
same labeling as the brand name drug.
Finally, generic entry in the pharmaceutical industry minimizes a number of potential
confounding factors when trying to isolate the effects of horizontal concentration change.
The pharmaceutical industry does not have the strong networking effects found in various
transportation, communication, and energy industries, for example. Horizontal concentra-
tion changes in the pharmaceutical industry are not accompanied by changes in vertical
integration and the complicated contractual relationships between supplier and producer
typically found in the oil and gas industry. Finally, pharmaceutical industry concentration
changes do not include a rebranding of the product found sometimes after mergers, although
prescription drugs have a branded and an unbranded version.
2.3.2 Pricing the Concentration Change in the Financial Market
Event study methodology is rooted in the rational expectations/efficient market tradi-
tion in financial economics. There is little controversy about the underlying assumptions,
statistical properties, and interpretation of short horizon event studies, as codified by Fama,
Fischer, Jensen, and Roll [16]. The efficient market hypothesis argues that capital markets
are efficient mechanisms which instantaneously impound all relevant information into the
stock price of a firm. In such a market, share prices only change when the market receives
value relevant new information. This paper examines how the announcements of ‘Paragraph
IV’ District Court decisions impact the brand drug’s stock returns. In this experiment, the
methodology credibly establishes that the outcome of the litigation caused the change in
returns.
Ideally, I would measure the returns on the entire residual value of the claim on brand
15Therefore, brand name drugs are product differentiated along four dimensions, with the active ingredient
as the last dimension.
16For example, generic Prozac is called fluoxetine.
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name drugs that can be replaced by generic competitors. However, much of the uncertainty
about the value consequences of generic entry can only be resolved over long periods of time.
Before the date of patent expiration, information arrives about the number of tentatively
approved generics,17 the identity of the generics, and sometimes, the date when generic
entry may begin. Only after patent expiration is the uncertainty resolved concerning how
quickly generics will enter (this depends partly on when the FDA awards approval), how the
generics will compete with each other and with the name brand drug, the resulting prices
and quantities (thus revenues), along with the total number of generic entrants. However,
long horizon event study methodology has relatively lower power and is more susceptible
to the joint-test problem.18 Therefore, I use the announcement of ‘Paragraph IV’ decisions
because they generate dramatic results above the normal background noise of returns and
short window tests have higher power.19
Pricing the announcement of ‘Paragraph IV’ decisions satisfies many of the standard,
short window event study assumptions. The gate keeping role of the court makes the timing
and outcome of these infringement decisions exogenous to the litigants. This minimizes
several biases that arise when firms are able to directly influence the event.20 Abnormal
returns are concentrated in the event window because there is no information leakage before
the decision is announced. ‘Paragraph IV’ decisions occur randomly since their timing is
the complete discretion of the judge, which means there is no event clustering in calendar
time.21 Finally, confounding effects in the event window are easily ruled out, there is no
problem with inaccurate announcement dates, and the shares of the brand name companies
in this sample are sold on the major American exchanges which rule out the need for thin
market corrections.
The brand firm’s pre-decision stock price and expectations about the trial’s outcome
17The FDA does publicly announce tentatively approved ANDA’s. Currently, this information can be
found on the webpage Drugs@FDA: FDA Approved Drug Products
18Event study tests are joint tests of whether abnormal returns are zero, and of whether the chosen model
of expected return, CAPM, market model, etc., is the true model (Khotari and Warner [37]).
19I also explored the announcements of tentative and full approvals of generics and the announcement of
awarding the Pediatric Exclusivity which grants six months extra marketing exclusivity due to additional
pediatric testing. However, these events did not generate as dramatic results.
20One potentially relevant bias stems from self selection which occurs because the sample of firms choosing
the event is not a random subset of the relevant population. This bias has the potential to render the
usual OLS/GLS estimators inconsistent. Examples of event studies with self selection biases include calling
a convertible bond (Acharya [1]), takeovers (Eckbo, Maksimovic, and Williams [15]), and the choice of
covenants attached to debt issues (Goyal [24]).
21Event clustering invalidates the assumption of independence in the cross section of abnormal returns.
(Khotari and Warner [37])
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can be easily interpreted within the one period state (Arrow-Debreu) price paradigm.22
‘Paragraph IV’ infringement decisions are anticipated events which means that expectations
about their outcomes are already impounded into the stock price when the decision is
announced.23 The binomial state space for the trial’s outcome after the completion of oral
arguments is that either the brand wins or the brand loses. The state dependent valuation
for the brand firm given the brand wins includes monopoly rents until the time the patent
expires, Vm, compared to the valuation given the brand faces generic entry, Vg. Expectations
about the likelihood of each outcome are captured in the state prices, ρm and ρg.24 Let V0
be the pre-decision valuation and rf be the risk-free rate. Therefore,
V0 =
1
1 + rf
{ρmVm + ρgVg}.
The brand firm’s pre-decision stock price represents a discounted convex combination of the
rents from a monopoly industry structure until the time of patent expiration and the rents
from generic entry.
The analysis of the binomial state price representation results from the realization that
there is no premium for the uncertainty in the announcement date. This uncertainty is not
priced because there is no correlation between the time that has passed since the end of
oral arguments and the likelihood of a particular decision. For example, if a judge is taking
a longer time than usual to decide a case, the market does not know whether she has a
difficult case, she has a full calendar, or any other of a myriad of explanations. Therefore,
the market learns nothing from the passage of time. Also, the probability of a decision
occurring on any date is equally likely and independent of the probability of a decision
occurring on the previous date.
The binomial state price representation of the brand firm’s stock price can be used to
isolate the sign of the concentration effect, even in the presence of expectations. Once again,
the brand firm’s pre-decision stock price can be modeled by a discounted convex combination
22The one period state price representation argues that an asset’s price today can be represented as the
summation over all possible states tomorrow of the state price multiplied by the state dependent valuation
all discounted by the risk free rate.
23Because patent expiration and the possibility of generic entry is a well known feature of a brand drug’s
product life cycle, prior beliefs about value relevance of patent expiration, in general, are impounded into
the stock price from the brand drug’s conception.
24State prices are often given probability interpretations since the price of a security that pays one dollar
only in the realization of a certain state increases with the probability of that state occurring.
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of the company’s valuation given the additional months of monopoly rents of the relevant
drug (i.e., the brand wins) and the valuation of the company without the additional months
of monopoly rent (i.e., the brand loses). Assuming the state price probability of each trial
outcome is strictly positive, then the pre-decision share price is strictly within the interval of
the two post-decision state contingent valuations. Therefore, a significant positive (negative)
abnormal return may be imbued with the interpretation that the market believed that the
event increased (decreased) the value of the corporation.
The difference between the ‘Announcement Effect’ and the ‘Valuation Effect’ reflects
how expectations impact the magnitude of the event’s value consequences.25 Conceptu-
ally, the ‘Valuation Effect’ reflects the entire value relevance of the event. In contrast, an
‘Announcement Effect’ exists when the abnormal performance captures the deviation of
the realized state contingent price from a price which included the market’s expectations
about the likelihood of that state. In event studies, the magnitude of abnormal performance
provides a measure of the unanticipated impact of the event on the wealth of firm’s claim
holders (Khotari and Warner [37]). When events are value relevant and complete surprises,
then abnormal returns naturally capture the ‘Valuation Effect’. However, in the case of
anticipated uncertain events, such as infringement decisions, expectations about the out-
come only allow event studies to capture an ‘Announcement Effect’. The abnormal returns
generated by ‘Paragraph IV’ decisions reflect an ‘Announcement Effect’ because they are
a function of the pre-decision stock price, which according to the state price paradigm, in-
cludes expectations about the trial’s outcome. Therefore, the abnormal return if the brand
wins is ARmt = V
−1
0 (Vm − V0), and if the brand loses is ARgt = V −10 (Vg − V0).
In contrast, the ‘Valuation Effect’ captures the added value a brand firm receives from
competing in a monopoly compared to facing generic entry. An ‘absolute’ ‘Valuation Effect’
is the value of a brand firm given it maintains monopoly rights minus the value given in
faces generic entry or Vm − Vg. However, it is difficult to compare this result across firms.
Therefore, I use a ‘relative’ ‘Valuation Effect’, or V −10 (Vm − Vg), which I will use as the
value of marketing exclusivity. This value of marketing exclusivity can be related back to
the abnormal returns estimated from the event study using the identity V −10 (Vm − Vg) =
ARmt −ARgt . Since ARgt has a negative sign, the value of marketing exclusivity is the sum
25I am borrowing this terminology from the ‘partial anticipation’ literature in event studies which addresses
events in which the firm decides whether the event occurs, its timing and its outcome.
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of the two abnormal returns.
2.4 The Data
2.4.1 Description and Summary Statistics
The sample consists of all ‘Paragraph IV’ District Court decisions pertaining to brand name
prescription drugs. The possible time period of these decisions ranges from the passage of
the Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984 through to 2007. The FDA publishes a list of all brand
name drugs for which a ‘substantially complete’ ‘Paragraph IV’ ANDA has been received
by the Office of Generic Drugs.26 To construct my sample, I began with the list of all brand
drugs whose ANDA was filed before 12/31/2004. This cut-off date balances the trade-off
of maximizing the sample while allowing enough time for the majority of drugs from this
time period to reach their first District Court decision.27 A ‘drug’ is defined as a molecule
with a unique combination of active ingredient and brand name. Therefore, different forms,
dosages, or indications within this combination do not constitute a distinct drug. There are
232 brand drugs for which an ANDA was first filed before 12/31/2004.
For each brand name drug on this list, I searched the LexisNexis R© Academic Power
Search of State and Federal Court Cases to find the complete set of brand drugs with a
‘Paragraph IV’ District Court decision.28 The search produced 76 distinct brand drugs
with at least one District Court decision.29 Brand drugs may not have a decision for a
multitude of reasons. Brand and generic companies may settle the litigation out of court.
Brand companies have other legal means to prevent generic entry besides patent protection.
For example, brand companies can petition the FDA challenging the safety and efficacy of
a generic copy. Finally, for many ANDAs applications, the brand company never filed the
infringement suit.
For the purpose of cross sectional consistency, I chose one District decision per drug.
26The Office of Generic Drugs is a department within the FDA. Note this list also includes the brand
name drug’s active ingredient, form, and dosage and it can be found on the FDA’s webpage ‘Paragraph IV
Patent Certifications’ (http://www.fda.gov/CDER/ogd/ppiv.htm).
27I also examined drugs through 12/31/2005, but very few had reached their first decision.
28I used the search terms “Brand and patent and (Paragraph IV or Hatch-Waxman or ANDA or infringe!
or valid! or invalid!)”
29However, the 76 brand drugs corresponded to 72 series of cases because the following drugs were tried
in the same case; Tenormin and Tenoretic, Wellbutrin SR and Zyban, Claritin and Claritin Reditabs, and
Micro K and K Dur.
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I only included those District Court decisions concerning the infringement and/or validity
of a patent protecting the brand drug. While some drugs had relatively simple litigation
which resulted in only one District Court decision, others can had complicated proceedings
which resulted in many District Court decisions occuring both simultaneously and over time.
Therefore, I developed a decision rule to select the ‘main’ decision in which the ‘majority’
of uncertainty about generic entry was resolved. For a series of District Court cases with
the same litigants and different patents, I chose the last case. This situation arises when
generics try to overturn patents in separate cases over time. The uncertainty about whether
and when generics can enter is therefore resolved with the last case.30 For a series of cases
with different litigants and the same patent, I chose the first case because it establishes
the precedent about how certain technical issues related to the patent will be interpreted.31
Finally, for a series of cases with the same defendants and the same patents, wherethere is a
District Court decision, followed by a Appellate Court decision which repeals and remands
the District Court decision, followed by a second District Court decision, I chose the first
of the District Court decisions.
The construction of this data set differs from two previous studies of ‘Paragraph IV’
filings and infringement litigation. The first study, conducted by the FTC [21], studied
all brand drugs that received notification of a ‘Paragraph IV’ ANDA from 1/1/1992 to
1/1/2001. This selection criterion produced 104 drugs, where a drug is defined by a unique
NDA. In their sample, the FTC [21] found that the brand company did NOT initiate
infringement litigation for 29 drugs, that there were District Court decisions for 30 drugs32,
and that 22 drugs still had pending cases at the end of the sample. The sample in this
paper expands the time period studied by the FTC and focuses solely on the outcome
of District Court decisions, not the outcome of ANDA filings. Berndt, Mortimer, and
Parece [5] examined whether authorized generic entry decreases ‘Paragraph IV’ Certification
filings. They examined three data sets; the FDA data set, a proprietary survey data set
by PhRMA,33 and a proprietary dataset by Paragraphfour.com which provides data on
all ‘Paragraph IV’ certifications that faced court challenges since 2003. The sample in
this paper is the first complete single source data set of the ‘main’ ‘Paragraph IV’ patent
30Examples of brand drugs in this category include Augmentin, Altace, Paxil, and Taxol.
31An example of a brand drug in this category is Wellbutrin SR.
32The brand company won 8 cases and the generics won 22.
33The PhRMA data set includes information for about 73% of brand drugs from the FDA data set.
38
infringement District Court decisions. It is also free and publicly available.
I argue that the uncertainty generated by patent infringement litigation was mostly
resolved at the District Court level.34 There is a record of Appellate Court decisions for
53 of the 72 District Court decisions. The Appellate Court upheld 26 of the 53 District
Court decision with no modification and the other 27 cases were either remanded back to
the District Court for partial or full reconsideration, or reversed. However, not all of the 27
‘modified’ Appellate decisions had any effect on generic entry as determined by the District
Court. Finally, the Supreme Court did not hear any of the cases in my sample where the
issue at trial related to the technical merits of patent infringement or validity.
To make the study viable, I dropped three sets of District Decisions. Since I used CRSP
stock pricing data, I excluded privately owned companies and companies with foreign list-
ings. I also excluded observations without an announcement date. The variable ’Announce-
ment Date’ captures the date the decision became public knowledge which is operationalized
as the first date any information about the decision appeared in the LexisNexis R© Academic
Power Search Database of US Newspapers and Wires.35 Except for the District Case per-
taining to Augmentin, the Announcement Date was always within a couple days after the
District Case’s official decision date. Finally, I also excluded brand drugs whose generic
manufacturer entered before the District Court Decision. According to the Hatch-Waxman
Act, a generic company can enter before a District Court decision if the 30-month stay
runs out. However, if the generic manufacturer enters and a future District or Appellate
Court decision finds for the brand, then a jury trial date is set to determine the damages.36
Once generic manufacturers enter, trial outcomes determine damage awards and not the
rents from exclusive marketing. The variable ’Generic Entry’ indicates the date which the
IMS Health Market Research Database Product Directory for the second quarter of 2007
recorded the first generic firm selling the molecule. If the data is missing from the IMS
source, then I used the FDA’s Drugs@FDA website to determine the date the first generic
received FDA approval to enter.
After dropping the above observations, the sample consists of 49 District Court cases
34This is an easily testable assumption by studying the outcome of Appellate decisions and the market
responses.
35I used the search terms “(Brand or Activeingred) and (patent or infringe! or valid! or invalid! or generic
or court)”.
36The level of damages is subject to considerable variability partly because courts have the discretion of
imposing triple damages if the infringement was deemed intentional.
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pertaining to 51 distinct brand name drugs. The District Court decisions included in the
study are listed in Table 2.7 in the Appendix and the excluded decisions, along with the
reason they were excluded are listed in Table 2.6.
The variable, ’Winner’, takes on the values Brand or Generic, and indicates the realized
state space or the outcome of the District case. Brand means the brand maintains marketing
exclusivity and Generic means there is generic entry.37 Winner is listed in Table 2.8. For
the 49 District Case sample, the brand firm won 23 cases and the generic won 26 cases.38
While ex-ante, the market may have believed that the likelihood of the brand winning each
individual case was different than 50%, ex-post, it appeared that a brand firm had just over
a 50% chance of ‘winning’ an average patent infringement case. As shown in Table 2.9, it
does not appear there was any time trend in the number of cases won by a brand or generic.
Nearly all of the District Court decisions occur after 1997. Table 2.9 depicts the number
of decisions by year for the 72 District cases, the 49 District case sample, and the number
of cases won for each group. Table 2.9 also indicates that the number of decisions each year
plateaued at five or six starting in 2002, which shows that besides the increasing number of
‘Paragraph IV’ ANDAs being filed with the FDA described in the previous section, there
was an increasing number of cases reaching District Court decisions. The post-1997 rise in
District Court cases coincides with a change to the FDA’s interpretation of the ‘180-day
Exclusivity Rule’.39
Because my study focuses on the product level, and not the entire firm, I created the
variable, Sales %. Sales % is the individual drug’s fraction of its total company sales during
the fiscal year before the decision. I used sales data from the Compustat Industrial Annual
File to find the total company sales for the respective year. The drug level sales data comes
from the magazine Drug Topics [14], which published a list of the top 200 brand name
drugs by US retail sales each year from 1999-2006. There are many limitations to using
37Note that these state spaces were defined to capture the legal possibility of generic entry. Typically,
the Brand wins when a relevant patent is found to be both valid and infringed, however Prilosec provides
an interesting counterexample. There were four generic defendants in the case and three were found to
infringe, while the fourth firm, Kudco, was found not to infringe. According to my criteria, the case should
have been labeled as Generic wins. However, two of the other generics, Andrex and Genpharm, had the
‘180 day exclusivity’ which meant that no other generic could enter until they shared 180 of exclusively
marketing their generic. Because, Kudco could not enter before Andrex and Genpharm, generic entry was
legally prevented until the patents expires and so the case was classified as Brand wins.
38For the original 72 District Case sample, the brand firm won 34 cases and the generic manufacturer won
38 cases.
39Between 1992 and 1998, the FDA did not grant the 180-day exclusivity to any generic. However, in
1998, the FDA lost a court ruling, changed its regulations, and started awarding this exclusivity to generics.
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this variable as a measure of the drug’s relative value to the firm. The ideal measure would
capture the market’s expectations at that time about what the drug’s future relative value
will be. Instead, I use an ex-post measure, which summarizes the value of the drug to the
firm in the past. Furthermore, this measure does not include any intangible value from
the drug, such as additional firm reputation effects, and the above mentioned measurement
error. However, while Sales % is thus noisy, it will provide a useful scaling variable. Sales
% is listed in Table 2.8.
The distribution of ‘Sales %’ is highly skewed towards relatively lower value drugs.
Table 2.1: Sales Percentage Summaries
Min Max Mean SD 25% 50% 75% Observations
Brand Wins 0.7594 63.51 10.01 15.12 1.208 2.920 13.58 23
Generic Wins 0.3864 100 12.31 23.19 0.8482 1.844 9.930 26
All Cases 0.3864 100 11.23 19.65 1.183 2.768 10.33 49
The above table indicates that the median for the various groups was between 1% and
3%, while the means were between 10% and 12%. While this sample does contain many
‘blockbusters’,40 which generate significant profits in absolute terms, the U.S. sales of many
of these drugs were still a relatively small fraction of the firm’s total cash flow. This raises
the possibility that the test statistic will not be able to capture the effect of an infringement
decision for these drugs. In other words, these lower relative value drugs may not generate
large enough firm level abnormal returns to be seen over the natural noise of stock prices.
Finally, I created two more variables, ‘Unique Expiration Date’ and ‘Exclusivity at
Issue’ to explore the dual state space assumption and the impact of the number of months
of patent protection at issue in the case. These variables were created by first looking at the
patent expiration dates in the European Patent Office’s online database esp@cenet. This
lists the date of application, date of grant, and any known extensions. I then double checked
the FDA’s website to see if the brand had been granted a six month pediatric exclusivity;
such information was not listed in esp@cenet. I repeated these calculations for every patent
at issue for each drug, and set the unique expiration date equal to the last expiration date
of all the patents at issue. Months of exclusivity at issue is then calculated as the number
of months elapsing between the date of the district court decision and the unique expiration
40Coined in 2000 and unadjusted for inflation, ‘blockbuster’ is the informal industry term for any drug
generating more than $1 billion of revenue for its owner each year.
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date. Table 2.10 provides a list of these variables. The table below provides the summary
statistics for Exclusivity at Issue.
Table 2.2: Marketing Exclusivity at Issue (Months)
Min Max Mean SD 25% 50% 75% Observations
Brand Wins 4 180 68.57 55.63 25 60 105 23
Generic Wins 16 231 113.38 68.05 43 135 168 26
All Cases 4 231 92.35 65.88 32 70 152 49
Comparing the means of the two groups, we see the average months of patent protection
for cases in which the generics won was nearly double the average number of months for
generics winning.
Finally, I explore the state space assumption. According to my argument, in order for
the dual state space assumption to apply, I need only one patent expiration date. This can
occur when there is only one patent at issue in the case or when there are multiple patents
with the same expiration date. However, there are cases in my sample with more than one
patent expiration date at issue. As noted above, in this case I took the expiration date of
the last patent as my unique expiration date. However, it is possible that multiple patents
and expiration dates may have additional influence on the outcomes. I will test for these
influences in Section 2.5.
2.5 Results and Discussion
Following standard event study methodology, I computed the abnormal returns using the
market model as the benchmark. I used the value weighted CRSP index, excluding divi-
dends, as the market index. I estimated the market model using returns from the 271 days
directly preceding the announcement date. I considered the abnormal returns over three
different event windows, because it is difficult to know when the market reaches its new
equilibrium solely due to the District Court announcement. The different event windows
provide a range of the abnormal returns, but it is still possible that the true value of the
abnormal return lies outside this range. The first two event windows and their respective
abnormal returns are the standard announcement day return, AR, and the announcement
day plus the day after return, CAR. These event windows begin on the announcement date
because there is no information leakage before the event. The last event window is the
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announcement day return plus the close to open return, denoted AR+. Unfortunately, the
exact time of day when the announcement is made is unknown and some announcements
were definitely made after the market closed on the announcement day. In these cases, the
abnormal returns do not show up in AR but do show in CAR. While the two day event
window is typically used when the time of the announcement is unknown, it may allow
more noise to affect the estimates. Therefore, I provide the three event windows to provide
a range of estimates to account for the unknown announcement time and to allow differing
amounts of time for the market to fully incorporate the information.
The results of the event study are summarized in Table 2.11. Table 2.11 divides the
results into two groups according to the ‘Decision’ variable – whether the brand or the
generic ‘won’ the case and reports the results for the three event windows. Not surprisingly,
Table 2.11 provides a strong sign result according to whether the brand won or lost the
case. The abnormal returns are positive (negative) when the brand ‘wins’ (‘loses’), with
the intuitive explanation that maintaining (losing) the right to exclusive marketing creates
(destroys) firm value. Furthermore, all of the abnormal returns have the appropriate sign,
given their respective trial outcomes. Because the brand firm’s stock return decreases with
generic entry, this experiment produces a concentration effect with the opposite sign found
by Hou and Robinson [31]. On the other hand, this result supports the work done by
Lustgarten and Thomadakis [44].
The table also partitions the results according to Sales %. The first three rows include
all the decisions involving a brand name drug with at least the stated Sales % in the
fiscal year before the decision. The last two rows include only those decisions where the
brand name drug had between 0% and 1%, and between 1% and 2% of its company’s
sales. Comparing rows one through three, the abnormal returns in each respective group
maintain their sign, but their magnitude and statistically significance decreases, although
they remain significant at conventional levels. However, examination of the bottom two
rows, which isolate the decisions in the lower percentages of the Sales % ranges, indicates
that the magnitude of these abnormal returns is very small and has the opposite sign for
the case of brand firms.
The purpose of finely partitioning the sample according to a noisy variable stems from
the consequences of using an event study to value the impact of one product within a
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firm.41 Short window methodology is ideal for isolating the effect of one drug in the US
market when each pharmaceutical company consists of a portfolio of drugs sold in numerous
countries. However, if the value of the individual drug is sufficiently small relative to some
measure of the firm’s value, it is possible that the effect of a ‘Paragraph IV’ decision would
be too small to register in the abnormal return. I expect the magnitude of the abnormal
returns to decrease with the Sales % until at some point, they are overwhelmed by the
natural noise of stock returns. This raises the possibility of using a Sales % based weighting
to recover the effect of ‘Paragraph IV’ decisions for drugs above this point, and requires
cutting drugs below the point. I argue that because the abnormal returns for drugs with a
Sales % between 0% and 1% and for which the brand firm won, have the ‘wrong’ sign, they
are simply noise and should be cut from the sample.
Before any weighting, the magnitude of the abnormal returns and the value of marketing
exclusivity for drugs with Sales % > 1% is dramatic. Table 2.11 indicates that the brand
firm’s value increases between 1.24% and 2.83% if it ’wins’, and decreases between -5.24%
and -5.82% when it ‘loses’. Once again, the one day returns are likely to undervalue the
estimate if there are any announcements about the Court’s decision that are made after
the market closed. However, the two day returns can add noise to estimates if the market
incorporates the information about the decision on the first day. These ranges provide the
estimates of the ‘Announcement Effect’. It appears that the magnitude of the abnormal
returns for the generic firms are roughly twice as big the magnitude for the brand firms,
in absolute value. One potential explanation is that the average number of months of
marketing exclusivity at issue for cases that generics won was twice as large as those for
cases that the brand won. I test the difference in magnitude shortly.
The value of marketing exclusivity (VME) for the three abnormal returns is provided
in the table below, Table 2.3.
Table 2.3: The Value of Marketing Exclusivity for Drugs with Sales % > 1%
Decision Cases AR t-stat AR+ CAR t-stat
Brand 20 1.24% 2.7 3.22 % 2.83 % 4.8
Generic 18 -5.24% -6.8 -5.59 % -5.82 % -5.9
VME 6.48% 8.81 % 8.65 %
41Most event studies focus on events that impact the entire firm, such as mergers.
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Once again, the value of marketing exclusivity is V −10 (Vm − Vg) = ARmt −ARgt . I find that
the value to a brand firm of maintaining marketing exclusivity is between 6.48% and 8.65%.
However, this range provides a lower bound on the results because I use an equal weighted
average. In other words, I treat drugs with a large Sales % exactly the same as one with
a small Sales % and the same holds true for Exclusivity at Issue. This range applies to a
sample with an average Sales % of 11.23%42 and an average Months of Monopoly Rents at
Issue of 92 months.
Before exploring a Sales % weighting, I regressed the CAR for drugs with Sales % >
1% to test some hypotheses. In order to facilitate the between group effect between brands
and generics, I switched the sign of the CAR for cases in which the generic won. I ran the
cross sectional regression
CARi = λo + I generic + λ1Sales%i + λ2State Spacei + λ3ln(Months)i + i.
I generic indicates whether a generic firm won, and is used to test whether the difference
beween the absolute value of the magnitude of the brand and the generic is statistically
significant. State Space corresponds to the number of unique patents and is used to test
whether cases without a clear binomial state space are different. ln(Months) indicates how
the number of months of marketing exclusivity affects CAR. I took the natural log of this
variable because the market discounts the cash flows in the distant future at a greater
rate. The regression was corrected for heteroskasdicity, and the Breusch-Pagan statistics
are provided below.
Table 2.4: CAR Determinants
CAR Coefficient Standard Error t-test
I generic .0121 .0135 0.9
Sales % .0016 .0005 3.1
State Space .0107 .0077 1.39
ln(Months) .0114 .0058 2.0
Constant -.0480 .0218 -2.2
Number of observations = 38, F (4, 33) = 5.93, Prob > F = 0.001, R-squared = 0.4897, Root MSE = .0474,
Breusch-Pagan: Prob > χ2 = .0004
This regression indicates Sales % and ln(Months) have significant explanatory power. On
the other hand, the difference in the absolute value of the magnitude of the CAR between the
42Note that the median is 2.89%.
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group is not significant, and State Space is not significant indicating that the 10 potential
cases with arguably more state spaces do not significantly affect my results.
Finally, I weight the abnormal returns by the inverse of Sales %. This allows me to
suppose each drug constitutes 100% of its company’s sales which means that the abnormal
return and VME estimates apply directly to the product level. The results for the sample
with Sales % greater than 1% are included in the table below.
Table 2.5: Sales Weighted Value of Marketing Exclusivity for Drugs with Sales % > 1%
Decision Cases AR AR+ CAR
Brand 20 4.02% 24.89% 18.37%
Generic 18 -57.75% -69.16% -50.45%
VME 61.77% 94.05 68.62 %
This table indicates that the value of maintaining marketing exclusivity for an individual
drug is between 61.77% and 94.05% of the drug’s monopoly value. This range applies to a
sample with an average Months of Monopoly Rents at Issue of 92 months.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper takes advantage of the uncertainty and the structure embedded in ‘Paragraph
IV’ District Court decisions. These decisions constitute a repeated exogenous change in
industry concentration with many useful empirical properties. In particular, they satisfy
the strict requirements for using a short window event study to estimate the decision’s
effect on the brand firm’s stock returns. They also have a binomial outcome space, which is
useful for determining the value of marketing exclusivity. However, while the short window
methodology is ideal for isolating the effect of one drug within the US market, it is unable
to capture the effect of drugs which constituted a small fraction of their firm’s total sales.
This paper’s estimates of a concentration effect produce the opposite sign to Hou and
Robinson [31]’s result, but agree with sign found by Lustgarten and Thomadakis [44]. Unlike
these authors, the event study methodology includes an intuitive explanation for the sign
of the results. I find that the announcement return for drugs with Sales % greater than
1% is between [1.24%, 2.83%] if the brand firm maintains its monopoly rights until patent
expiration, and between [-5.24%, -5.82%] if the brand faces generic entry. These results are
both highly economically and statistically significant, and they indicate that ‘Paragraph
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IV’ decisions are an important industry phenomena that may have important consequences
for how the lifecycle of brand drugs are managed and for future research and development.
Finally, I use these returns to construct the first market valuation of the monopoly rents. I
estimate that the value to a brand firm of maintaining marketing exclusivity for an average
92 months is between [6.48%, 8.65%].
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Table 2.7: ‘Paragraph IV’ District Court Decisions Included in Study
Brand Active Ingredient Company
1. Accupril Quinapril Hydrochloride Pfizer
2. Acular Ketorolac Tromethamine Allergan / Roche
3. Alphagan Brimonidine Tartrate Allergan
4. Altace Ramipril King
5. Augmentin Amoxicillin; Clavulanate Potassium GlaxoSmithKleine
6. Buspar Buspirone Hydrochloride Bristol Myers
7. Celebrex Celecoxib Pfizer
8. Claritin; Claritin Reditabs Loratadine Schering Plough
9. DDAVP Desmopressin Acetate Sanofi Aventis
10. Ditropan XL Oxybutynin Chloride Alza/J&J
11. Duragesic Fentanyl Alza/J&J
12. Fosamax Alendronate Sodium Merck
13. Glucophage XR Metformin Hydrochloride Bristol Squibb
14. Levaquin Levofloxacin Ortho/J&J
15. Lexapro Escitalopram Oxalate Forest
16. Lipitor Atorvastatin Calcium Pfizer
17. Lovenox Enoxaparin Sodium Sanofi Aventis
18. Mircette Desogestrel; Ethinyl Estradiol Akzo Nobel
19. Monopril Fosinopril Sodium Bristol Myers
20. Naprelan Naproxen Sodium Elan
21. Norvasc Amlodipine Besylate Pfizer
22. Paxil Paroxetine Hydrochloride GlaxoSmithKline
23. Pepcid Famotidine Merck/Yamamouchi
24. Platinol Cisplatin Bristol Myers Squibb
25. Plendil ER Felodipine AstraZeneca
26. Prilosec Omeprazole AstraZeneca
27. Protonix Pantoprazole Sodium Wyeth
28. Prozac Fluoxetine Hydrochloride Eli Lilly
29. Rebetol Ribavirin Ribapharm
30. Relafen Nabumetone GlaxoSmithKleine
31. Remeron Mirtazapine Akzo Nobel
32. Retrovir Zidovudine Burroughs Wellcome
33. Risperdal Risperidone Johnson & Johnson
34. Sarafem Fluoxetine Hydrochloride Eli Lilly
35. Sporanox Itraconazole Janssen/J&J
36. Tambocor Flecainide Acetate 3M Pharma
37. Taxol Paclitaxel Bristol Myers
38. Tiazac Diltiazem Hydrochloride Biovail
39. Topamax Topiramate Ortho-McNeil / J&J
40. Toprol XL Metoprolol Succinate AstraZeneca
41. Tricor Fenofibrate Abbott
42. Ultane Sevoflurane Abbott
43. Vicoprofen Hydrocodone Bitartrate and Ibuprofen Abbott
44. Wellbutrin SR; Zyban Bupropion Hydrochloride GlaxoSmithKleine
45. Wellbutrin XL Bupropion Hydrochloride Biovail
46. Xalatan Latanoprost Pfizer
47. Zantac Ranitidine Glaxo Inc
48. Zofran Ondansetron Hydrochloride GlaxoSmithKleine
49. Zyprexa Olanzapine Eli Lilly
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Table 2.8: ‘Paragraph IV’ District Court Decisions Included in Study II
Brand Generic Entry Decision Announcement Winner Sales%
1. Accupril 12/2004 06/28/2004 06/30/2004 Brand 1.18
2. Acular N/A 12/20/2003 12/31/2003 Brand 4.4**
3. Alphagan 05/2003* 05/08/2002 05/09/2002 Generic 10.33
4. Altace N/A 07/17/2006 07/18/2006 Brand 39.52
5. Augmentin 11/2002 07/19/2002 05/23/2002 Generic 6.28
6. Buspar 04/2001 03/13/2001 03/14/2001 Generic 1.46
7. Celebrex N/A 03/20/2007 03/20/2007 Brand 2.75
8. Claritin; Claritin Reditabs 01/2003 08/08/2002 08/08/2002 Generic 22.9
9. DDAVP 02/2005 02/07/2005 02/10/2005 Generic 0.86
10. Ditropan XL 11/2006* 09/27/2005 09/28/2005 Generic 0.71
11. Duragesic 07/2004 03/25/2004 03/25/2004 Brand 2.51
12. Fosamax N/A 08/28/2003 08/28/2003 Brand 2.47
13. Glucophage XR 04/2008 12/12/2007 12/13/2007 Brand 0.76
14. Levaquin N/A 12/12/2004 12/23/2004 Brand 2.76
15. Lexapro N/A 07/13/2006 07/14/2006 Brand 63.51
16. Lipitor N/A 12/16/2005 12/16/2005 Brand 11.35
17. Lovenox N/A 06/15/2005 06/16/2005 Generic 1.60
18. Mircette 04/2002 12/06/2001 12/07/2001 Generic 0.76
19. Monopril 11/2003 10/27/2003 10/27/2003 Generic 1.32
20. Naprelan 12/2002 03/14/2002 03/15/2002 Generic 1.98**
21. Norvasc 03/2007 02/27/2007 02/27/2007 Brand 4.46
22. Paxil 09/2003 03/03/2003 03/04/2003 Generic 6.73
23. Pepcid 04/2001 10/01/1998 10/14/1998 Brand 5.08
24. Platinol 11/1999 10/21/1999 11/03/1999 Generic 0.55**
25. Plendil ER 11/2004 08/21/2003 08/22/2003 Brand 0.96
26. Prilosec 12/2002 10/11/2002 10/11/2002 Brand 23.74
27. Protonix 09/2007 09/06/2007 09/07/2007 Generic 9.93
28. Prozac 08/2001 01/12/1999 01/13/1999 Brand 22.74
29. Rebetol 04/2004 07/14/2003 07/16/2003 Generic 48.27
30. Relafen 08/2001 08/14/2001 08/14/2001 Generic 1.290
31. Remeron 02/2003 12/18/2002 12/19/2002 Generic 2.70
32. Retrovir 09/2005 07/22/1993 07/22/1993 Brand 5.56**
33. Risperdal N/A 10/13/2006 10/16/2006 Brand 2.92
34. Sarafem N/A 07/29/2004 08/16/2004 Brand 1.08
35. Sporanox 02/2005 07/28/2004 07/29/2004 Generic 0.39
36. Tambocor 03/2002 04/17/2001 04/17/2001 Generic 0.60
37. Taxol 10/2000 03/01/2000 03/01/2000 Generic -54.94**
38. Tiazac 04/2003* 03/06/2000 03/08/2000 Generic 100**
39. Topamax N/A 03/20/2007 03/22/2007 Brand 2.86
40. Toprol XL 09/2007 01/17/2006 01/18/2006 Generic 5.36
41. Tricor 05/2002 03/19/2002 03/21/2002 Generic 1.71
42. Ultane 03/2006 09/26/2005 09/23/2005 Generic 0.64
43. Vicoprofen 04/2003* 09/12/2002 09/12/2002 Generic 0.85
44. Wellbutrin SR; Zyban 01/2004 02/28/2002 03/01/2002 Generic 3.97
45. Wellbutrin XL 01/2006* 11/22/2006 08/02/2006 Generic 33.94**
46. Xalatan N/A 07/06/2004 07/07/2004 Brand 0.77
47. Zantac 07/1997 09/17/1993 09/17/1993 Brand 14.17
48. Zofran 12/2006 08/20/2004 08/24/2004 Brand 1.21
49. Zyprexa N/A 04/14/2005 04/14/2005 Brand 13.58
*These dates are sourced from FDA data, not the IMS Generic Spectra Set.
** These figures are sourced from newspaper reports of company filings.
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Table 2.9: Number of ‘Paragraph IV’ District Court Decisions by Year
Year 72 District Cases Brand Wins 49 District Cases Brand Wins
1991 1 1 0 0
1992 0 0 0 0
1993 2 2 2 2
1994 0 0 0 0
1995 0 0 0 0
1996 1 0 0 0
1997 0 0 0 0
1998 1 1 1 1
1999 2 1 2 1
2000 2 0 2 0
2001 4 0 4 0
2002 9 1 9 1
2003 6 3 6 3
2004 7 6 7 6
2005 8 2 6 2
2006 6 4 5 3
2007 6 4 5 4
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Table 2.10: State Space and Months of Exclusivity at Issue
Brand Announcement Patents Final Patent Unique Expiration Dates Exclusivity
Expiration (State Space) at Issue (Mnths)
1. Accupril 06/28/2004 4,743,450 02/2007 1 32
2. Acular 12/20/2003 5,110,493 05/2009 1 29
3. Alphagan 05/08/2002 6,194,415 08/2020 219
6,248,741
4. Altace 07/17/2006 5,061,722 10/2008 1 27
5. Augmentin 07/19/2002 6,031,093 04/2018 1 189
6,048,977
6,051,703
6,218,380
6. Buspar 03/13/2001 6,150,365 06/2020 1 231
7. Celebrex 03/20/2007 5,466,823 09/2016 1 114
5,563,165
5,760,068
8. Claritin; 08/08/2002 4,659,716 04/2005 1 32
Claritin Reditabs
9. DDAVP 02/10/2005 5,047,398 09/2008 1 43
10. Ditropan XL 09/27/2005 6,124,355 05/2018 1 152
11. Duragesic 03/25/2004 4,588,580 07/2004 1 4
12. Fosamax 08/28/2003 5,994,329 08/2018 1 180
13. Glucophage XR 12/12/2007 6,340,475 11/2021 2 167
6,635,280
14. Levaquin 12/23/2004 5,053,407 12/2010 1 72
15. Lexapro 07/13/2006 RE. 34,712 03/2012 1 68
16. Lipitor 12/16/2005 4,681,893 12/2010 2 60
5,273,995
17. Lovenox 06/15/2005 5,389,616 02/2012 2 80
RE. 38,743
18. Mircette 12/06/2001 RE. 35,724 02/2013 1 134
19. Monopril 10/27/2003 5,006,344 04/2008 1 56
20. Naprelan 03/14/2002 5,637,320 06/2014 1 147
21. Norvasc 02/27/2007 4,879,303 09/2007 1 7
22. Paxil 03/03/2003 4,721,723 10/2006 1 43
23. Pepcid 10/01/1998 4,283,408 10/2000 1 24
24. Platinol 10/21/1999 5,562,925 10/2013 1 168
25. Plendil ER 08/21/2003 4,803,081 10/2007 1 50
26. Prilosec 10/11/2002 4,786,505 08/2006 2 70
4,853,230
27. Protonix 09/06/2007 4,758,579 07/2010 1 34
28. Prozac 01/12/1999 4,314,081 02/2001 2 25
4,626,549
29. Rebetol 07/14/2003 5,767,097 09/2018 3 182
6,063,772
6,150,337
30. Relafen 08/14/2001 4,420,639 12/2002 1 16
31. Remeron 12/18/2002 5,977,099 06/2017 1 174
32. Retrovir 07/22/1993 4,724,232 06/2006 6 155
4,828,838
4,833,130
4,837,208
4,818,538
4,818,750
33. Risperdal 10/13/2006 4,804,663 12/2007 1 14
34. Sarafem 07/29/2004 4,971,998 09/2018 1 170
35. Sporanox 07/28/2004 5,633,015 05/2014 1 118
36. Tambocor 04/17/2001 4,650,873 03/2004 35
4,642,384
37. Taxol 03/01/2000 5,670,537 09/2016 2 198
5,641,803
38. Tiazac 03/06/2000 5,529,791 06/2013 1 159
39. Topamax 03/20/2007 4,513,006 09/2008 1 18
40. Toprol XL 01/17/2006 5,001,161 01/2009 2 36
5,081,154
41. Tricor 03/19/2002 4,895,726 01/2007 1 58
42. Ultane 09/26/2005 5,990,176 01/2017 1 136
43. Vicoprofen 09/12/2002 4,587,252 12/2004 1 27
44. Wellbutrin SR; 02/28/2002 5,427,798 08/2013 1 138
Zyban
45. Wellbutrin XL 11/22/2006 6,096,341 10/2018 1 143
46. Xalatan 07/06/2004 5,296,504 06/2012 2 95
5,422,368
47. Zantac 09/17/1993 4,521,431 06/2002 1 105
48. Zofran 08/20/2004 4,753,789 12/2006 1 28
5,578,628
49. Zyprexa 04/14/2005 5,229,382 07/2010 1 63
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Table 2.12: Individual Abnormal Returns for Brand Firms
Brand Drug Decision AR t-stat AR+ CAR t-stat
1. Accupril Brand -0.0063 -0.4148 -0.0084 -0.0077 -0.4849
2. Acular Brand 0.0079 0.4103 0.0075 0.0093 0.3984
3. Alphagan Generic -0.0384 -1.3322 -0.0393 -0.0955 -2.3377
4. Altace Brand 0.0019 0.3764 0.0149 -0.0033 -0.0820
5. Augmentin Generic -0.0366 -2.0808 -0.1043 -0.1152 -6.5338
6. Buspar Generic -0.0302 -0.6805 -0.0521 -0.0362 -0.6962
7. Celebrex Brand 0.0025 0.1652 -0.0002 0.0038 0.1832
8. Claritin; Claritin Reditabs Generic -0.0779 -2.5676 0.0888 -0.0789 -2.0479
9. DDAVP Generic 0.0092 0.4322 0.0030 0.0071 0.2396
10. Ditropan XL Generic -0.0043 -0.3912 -0.0084 -0.0014 -0.0989
11. Duragesic Brand 0.0016 0.1105 0.0076 0.0014 0.0789
12. Fosamax Brand -0.0172 -0.9604 -0.0134 -0.0106 -0.4195
13. Glucophage XR Brand -0.0019 -0.1295 -0.0092 -0.0154 -0.8174
14. Levaquin Brand 0.0043 0.3399 0.0072 0.0036 0.2555
15. Lexapro Brand 0.1601 7.5154 0.1488 0.1529 5.1137
16. Lipitor Brand -0.0071 -0.3347 0.1067 0.0781 2.7383
17. Lovenox Generic -0.0513 -3.2039 -0.0340 -0.0249 -1.1043
18. Mircette Generic -0.0064 -0.2337 0.0048 -0.0004 -0.0106
19. Monopril Generic 0.0015 0.0668 0.0071 0.0016 0.0533
20. Naprelan Generic -0.0266 -0.4607 -0.0122 -0.0253 -0.3452
21. Norvasc Brand -0.0036 -0.2207 0.0040 -0.0134 -0.7015
22. Paxil Generic -0.0200 -0.8472 -0.0200 -0.0256 -1.0356
23. Pepcid Brand -0.0245 .1.1572 -0.0332 -0.0393 -1.3893
24. Platinol Generic 0.0104 0.4164 0.0202 0.0080 0.2277
25. Plendil ER Brand -0.0147 -.4317 -0.0160 -0.0093 -0.2175
26. Prilosec Brand 0.0156 0.5117 0.1293 0.1374 3.4713
27. Protonix Generic -0.0248 -1.5534 -0.0176 -0.0086 -0.4139
28. Prozac Brand 0.0603 2.1649 0.0766 0.0854 2.2655
29. Rebetol Generic -0.1961 -2.9738 -0.1888 -0.1718 -1.9078
30. Relafen Generic -0.0006 -0.0265 -0.0086 -0.0077 -0.2335
31. Remeron Generic -0.0223 -0.9032 -0.0365 0.0198 0.7784
32. Retrovir Brand 0.0462 1.7067 0.0594 0.0466 1.7206
33. Risperdal Brand 0.0041 0.3734 0.0149 0.0235 2.1321
34. Sarafem Brand 0.0150 0.7836 0.0148 0.0097 0.3902
35. Sporanox Generic -0.0065 -0.4737 -0.0114 -0.0109 -0.6067
36. Tambocor Generic -0.0178 -0.6331 -0.0022 0.0308 0.8281
37. Taxol Generic -0.1213 -4.1899 -0.1067 -0.0915 -2.6136
38. Tiazac Generic -0.0283 -0.7701 -0.0294 -0.1168 -2.4303
39. Topamax Brand -0.0058 -0.6737 0.0006 -0.0121 -1.1778
40. Toprol XL Generic -0.0432 -2.7367 -0.0428 -0.0511 -3.1317
41. Tricor Generic 0.0099 0.4646 0.0116 0.0356 1.6586
42. Ultane Generic 0.0060 0.4479 -0.0110 -0.0308 -1.6452
43. Vicoprofen Generic 0.0057 0.1915 0.0057 -0.0116 -0.3331
44. Wellbutrin SR; Zyban Generic 0.0180 0.8853 -0.0135 -0.0090 -0.3133
45. Wellbutrin XL Generic -0.2543 -6.6931 -0.2296 -0.2470 -4.8479
46. Xalatan Brand -0.0059 -0.3890 -0.0059 0.0090 0.5181
47. Zantac Brand 0.0139 0.4869 0.0587 0.0492 1.3523
48. Zofran Brand -0.0063 -0.3980 0.0030 0.0075 0.3766
49. Zyprexa Brand -0.0243 -1.3336 0.0453 0.0447 1.7496
AR= Announcement Day Abnormal Return.
AR+= Day After Announcement Day Abnormal Return.
CAR = Announcement Day + Day After Abnormal Returns.
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Chapter 3
The Coefficient of Variation of
Profit and other Cross-Sectional
Determinants of Beta
3.1 Introduction
Researchers in finance often make assumptions about some proposed factors, the CAPM
‘Beta’, and expected returns. Examples of these factors have ranged from firm level and
market variables to macroeconomic indicators. In the financial literature, there has been an
enduring focus on the relationship between these variables or factors and expected returns,
mostly asking what factors explain the cross section of returns and by how much. The
literature has also wrestled with the relationship between Beta and expected returns, again
mostly focusing on the ability of Beta to explain the cross section of expected returns.
Some influential works include Fama and French [17], who argued that the static Beta had
no power to explain the cross section of expected returns, Lettau and Ludvigson [42] and
Jagannathan and Wang [35], who accounted for time varying risk premia, and Campbell
and Vuolteenaho [9], who decomposed both a static and a time varying Beta into a discount
rate and cash flow Betas.
However, the literature has largely neglected the relationship between proposed factors
and Beta, either static or time varying, especially with respect to questions concerning the
cross sectional determinants of Beta. In the late 1970’s, Rosenberg [54] argued that the
variance of earnings, the variance of cash flows, growth in earnings per share, market capi-
talization, dividend yield, and debt-to-assets were explanatory variables of Beta.1 Through
1He went on to found Barra Inc., which developed proprietary models calculating the cost of capital.
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the 1980’s, Hamada [27], Myers [49], Lev [43], Manderlker and Rhee [46] among others stud-
ied financial and operating leverage and largely found that Beta increased in both types of
leverages. More recently, Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan [22] considered the association
of firm level variables with an implied cost of capital.2 However, there has been no recent
work updating our knowledge of the cross sectional determinants of static Betas.
How could this understanding further academic research? In empirical asset pricing,
Beta is one of the three (see Fama and French [17]) or four (see Carhart [10]) factors used
as a benchmark model to determine whether new factors have additional power to explain
the cross section of expected returns. However, there are two weaknesses of the Fama
and French methodology which may hinder uncovering the true additional explanatory
power of proposed factors. First, this literature relies on grouping procedures, or sorting
stocks into portfolios. This practice does mitigate the attenuation bias associated with
measurement error and to make the number of cross sectional observations less the the
number of time periods, which increases the available econometric methodology. However,
portfolio grouping also reduces the cross sectional variation in Beta which may lead to
imprecise estimates. Secondly, there is no interaction term to explore how the proposed
factor influence expected returns through Beta. Models without this interaction term may
be overstating the importance of factor. Studying the cross sectional determinants of Beta
may provide motivation and evidence for which variables should be estimated in a model
with an interaction term and which should not.
Besides the relationship between asset pricing factors and Beta, understanding the firm
level determinants of Beta has additional implications. Despite Beta’s inability to determine
the cross section of expected returns, it is still plays a primary role in capital budgeting
(see Jagannathan and Meir [34]). More fundamental issues include exploring possible rela-
tionships between firm level variables and Beta with the goal of creating theoretical links
between fundamental models in both industrial organization and finance. For example,
there is some empirical evidence that the coefficient of variation of profit is a candidate
to provide this link. Empirically, one definition of profitability is earnings scaled by as-
sets, (see Vuolteenaho [62]). As described earlier, Rosenberg [54] has long established that
explanatory power of the variance of both earnings and cash flows. Gebhardt, Lee, and
2Based on a discounted residual income model, an implied cost of capital is the internal rate of return
that equates the current stock price to the present value of all future cash flows.
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Swaminathan [22] considered the coefficient of variation of earnings with regards to the
implied cost of capital. However, earnings or cash flows scaled by assets or market capital-
ization has not been considered and may provide empirical evidence that the coefficient of
variation of profitability has cross sectional explanatory power for Beta.
The objective of this paper is to explore the cross-sectional determinants of Beta using
recent data and newer econometric techniques. The two main goals of this exercise is to
understand the explanatory power of popular asset pricing variables and firm level variables,
such as the coefficient of variation of profit. The estimation is largely based on a procedure
developed by Lehmann [41] and uses a minimum distance approach that reduces to the
familiar least squares estimators. This approach permits the estimation of dataset where
the number of cross sectional observations is larger than the number of time period, so that
imprecise portfolio sorting procedures do not have to be used. This approach also accounts
for the measurement error in Beta in the asymptotic covariance matrix of the estimates,
which places more weight on observations whose Beta was estimated more accurately. To
explore the potential of scaling earnings, I use two different sets of variables where one is
weighted by assets and the other is weighted by market capitalization, when appropriate.
Finally, I include two robust checks, one of which includes adding industry fixed effects.
The results are always presented in sets of two regressions. The first set regresses Beta
Asset, Beta A, on a set of variables that are scaled by assets, whenever applicable. These
variables are financial leverage, the dividend yield, the log of assets, turnover, the bid ask
spread percentage and the coefficient of variation of earnings divided by assets, henceforth
known as the ‘earnings’ variable, to proxy for the coefficient of variation of profit. I also
include an interaction term to separate out those firms with a positive earnings variable
from those with a negative earnings variable. I also regress Beta on a set of variables scaled
by market capitalization, whenever applications. These variables are book-to-market, the
dividend yield, the log of size, turnover, the bid ask spread percentage, and the coefficient
of variation of earnings divided by market capitalization, along with its interaction term.
I find some striking results with respect to both the two asset pricing variables and
the ‘earnings’ variable (the coefficient of variation of profit proxy). Since my statistics are
pooled over different time period, I cite the the statistics from the 2001 subperiod because it
has three times as many observations as the rest of the periods combined. Turnover has the
largest magnitude and t-statistics in both sets of regressions. In 2001, the means of Beta A
57
and Beta were .94 and 1.2 respectively. I found that a one standard deviation change in
turnover increased the magnitude of Beta A by .22 and Beta by .25. The bid ask spread
percentage had a larger magnitude coefficient in the ‘Market’ regressions, which indicated
that a one standard deviation change in this variable increased Beta by .08. On the other
hand, I found that ln(assets), ln(size), and book-to-market had the smallest magnitudes
and t-statistics, which indicates that the first two variables have little explanatory power
beyond their scaling effect. Finally, both regressions indicate that as the ‘earnings’ variable
increases (decreases) for firms with a positive (negative) ‘earnings’ variable, Beta increases.
For the 2001 subperiod in the ‘Market’ regressions, a one standard deviation change in
the absolute value of earnings, increases Beta by a magnitude of .1 and .15 for firms with
positive and negative ‘earnings’. Furthermore, none of the above results is sensitive to the
inclusion of Turnover.
The remainder of this paper is divided into five sections. Section 3.2 discusses the
estimation procedure. Section 3.3 describes the data construction, motivates the variables
used in the study and their relationship to Beta, and includes the preliminary statistics.
Sections 3.4 includes the main empirical results and describes the outcome of two different
robustness checks. Finally, the conclusion discusses possible extensions to this study.
3.2 Empirical Methodology
The purpose of this exercise is to consider the cross sectional determinants of Beta disre-
garding the possibility of time varying parameters. The estimation is largely based on a
procedure developed by Lehmann [41] but modified slightly to fit the application at hand.
Conceptually, it proceeds as follows. I first divide the data into 5 year non-overlapping
intervals. A 60 month period is the conventional observation interval for estimating cross
sectional Betas, so I assume this length is applicable for constructing the explanatory vari-
ables. Next, I reduce the data from each 5 year interval into a single cross sectional unit for
that period. Therefore, an observation is a firm with 5 years of data reduced into a single
statistic for each variable. Next, I use a minimum distance approach, which reduces to the
familiar least squares estimators, to determine the cross sectional parameters for each 5
year interval. Finally, I use two different methods to pool the estimates or aggregate the
statistics from the five year periods.
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First I reduce the data from the five year intervals into single cross sectional observations.
This is a straight forward exercise with the explanatory variables because they are directly
observable and they are mapped to 5 year means and standard deviations. In contrast, Beta
is not directly observable and therefore I must utilize imperfect market model estimates.
In each different 5 year period, t, and for each different firm, i, I estimate Beta using the
standard single index market model
Rit,tm = α
i
t + β
i
tR
M
t,tm + 
i
t,tm ,
where tm indicates the monthly periods within t. As βˆit is a function of the residuals, 
i
t,tm ,
from its respective regression, it includes measurement error.
For the cross sectional regressions, I use a traditional method of moments or minimum
distance approach as in Lehmann [41]. Conceptually, this approach is based on asymp-
totic theory, which means that the measurement error in the Betas is accounted for in
the asymptotic covariance matrix of the parameter estimates. While the reliance on con-
ventional asymptotic theory facilitates straightforward inference, there is no small sample
measurement error correction applied directly to Beta. Therefore, the estimates are consis-
tent and asymptotically normal, but in small samples, they suffer from the usual attenuation
bias arising from measurement error. This bias diminishes as the sample moments converge
to their population analogs and the measurement error in the sample moments becomes
more accurately accounted for in the asymptotic covariance matrix of the parameter esti-
mates. Since the number of observations in my intervals range from 103 in the earliest, to
930 in the latest, the estimates in the different intervals will reflect differing amounts of
attenuation bias.
The measurement error in the Betas is incorporated into the cross sectional weighted
least squares estimators through the construction of two weighting matrices St and Wt. Let
Xt be the data matrix and λt be the vector of parameters to estimate. The cross sectional
regression is
βt = Xtλt + νt. (3.1)
However, I only observe βˆt, whose relationship to βt is given by βˆt = βt + ηt, where ηt is a
column vector whose ith entry is given by ηit such that
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ηit =
(
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Note that ηit selects only the portion of the error attributable to β
i
t, disregarding the portion
due to the coefficient αit. To estimate a cross sectional regression on the true βt, equation
3.1 becomes
βt = Xtλt + νt − ηt. (3.2)
This equation specifies how the errors from the market model regression interact with the
errors from the cross sectional econometric model. The weighted least squares estimator
and its covariance matrix are given by
λˆt =
(
X ′tW
−1
t Xt
)−1
X ′tWtβˆt (3.3)
Var
(
λˆt
)
=
(
X ′tW
−1
t Xt
)−1
X ′tWtE
[
(νt − ηt) (νt − ηt)′
]
W−1t Xt
(
X ′tW
−1
t Xt
)−1
.
Next, I develop a sample analog for the covariance matrix. By assuming that νt and ηt
are uncorrelated, and that νt is uncorrelated across assets, the covariance matrix may be
reasonably approximated by
Var
(
λˆ
)
≈ (X ′tW−1t Xt)−1X ′tWtE [ηtη′t]W−1t Xt (X ′tW−1t Xt)−1 . (3.4)
I will use St as an estimate of E
[
ηˆtηˆt
′] and construct it from the market model residuals
such that
St : St,(i,j) =
(
ˆt,i′ ˆt,i
)
/58.
Therefore, the weighting matrix, Wt, is
Wt = (diag (St))
−1
which is simply the standard errors of the market model regressions. Therefore, this estima-
tion technique places more weight on observations whose βt was estimated more accurately.
Finally, I use the two different approaches suggested by Lehmann [41] to pool the es-
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timates. The first approach uses the asymptotic covariance matrix for each interval as
weights. The pooled estimates along with the covariance matrix for the whole sample are
λˆ =
[
T∑
t=1
Vˆ −1t
]−1 T∑
t=1
Vˆ −1t λˆt, V (λˆ) =
[
T∑
t=1
Vˆ −1t
]−1
where T is the number of 5 year subperiods. While this method incorporate information
about the relative accuracy of the different cross sectional regression, it is also more sus-
ceptible to the inaccuracy of the asymptotic covariance matrices in small samples. The
second approach aggregates the minimum distance estimates by a weighting based on the
number of observations, nt, in each subsample. The pooled estimates and its corresponding
covariance matrix are
λˆ =
T∑
t=1
τtλˆt, V (λˆ) =
T∑
t=1
τ2t λˆt
where τt = nt/
∑T
t=1 nt. This method is more conservative because it produces estimates
with higher asymptotic variances. These two aggregation methods can produce substan-
tially different results and considerable attention should be paid to interpreting aggregated
minimum distance estimators. For the rest of this paper, I will presume that the estimates
aggregated by subperiod sample size are more reasonable because they place more weight
on estimates with more observations.
3.3 Variable and Data Description
3.3.1 Data Construction
The sample of firms includes all U.S. companies in the intersection of the monthly CRSP re-
turn files and Compustat industrial annual. I follow Da [13] for the exact Compustat/CRSP
merging procedure. I exclude utility companies (SICCD in [4900,4999]) because regulated
firms may face lower cost of capital due to lower operating risk, potentially from limited
entry and exit, or because their capital structure is legally restrained. Finally, I employ
the corrections suggested in Shumway [56] for the de-listing bias. This entails assigning a
return of -.3 to a firm delisted for performance related reasons.3
3Performance related reasons are given a delisting code of 500 or in the range of [520, 584].
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To ensure that accounting information is already impounded into stock returns, Fama
and French [19] codified the practice of matching monthly return data from June of year t
to May of year t+1 with Compustat industrial data for the fiscal year ending in December
of t − 1. All Compustat data is calculated on an annual basis, except the coefficient of
variance for the earnings variables, which are calculated quarterly for more precise sample
analogs. For the purposes of consistency, I use the same Compustat/CRSP matching rule
for quarterly data as I do for annual data. Therefore, I substitute four quarterly observations
into the same time frame I placed one annual observation.
3.3.2 Variable Description
In the following subsections, I describe the variables used in the cross sectional analysis.
Throughout this paper, I consider two set of variables, referred to as ‘Book’ variables and
‘Market’ variables, for separate regressions. The ‘Book’ variables are characterized by the
construction of all the relevant firm level variables in terms of assets, while the ‘Market’
variables are defined in terms of market capitalization, whenever applicable. This constant
scaling makes the coefficients on these variable easier to compare and helps to determine
whether the significance of these variables arises simply due to scaling or whether they
should be included in their own right. Note that both the ‘Book’ and the ‘Market’ regressions
include variables that obviously should not scaled by the above respective scaling variable.
Finally, throughout the history of modern finance, many variables have been considered
in relation to the CAPM and the cross section of stock returns. Therefore, my operational
practice is to include the variables that not only fit my original criteria, but that are also
in some sense well known and well used. Variables that were considered and discarded
include market financial leverage, both book and market operating leverage, earnings per
share, and growth in earnings per share. There are, however, two set of variables which
have been shown to be associated with Beta and which I knowingly exclude from this study.
The first set of variables are based on I/B/E/S data and were also used in Gebhardt, Lee,
and Swaminathan’s [22] study. They are the long run earnings growth rate forecast, made
famous by La Porta [39]4, the average mean absolute error of the last five annual I/B/E/S
consensus forecasts, and the dispersion of analyst earnings forecasts for the current fiscal
year. I exclude these variables partly because I/B/E/S data is only available starting in
4La Porta showed that high LTG firms earn lower subsequent returns.
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1980 but mainly because according to La Porta, it is only available for a limited subset of the
merged Compustat/CRSP dataset. He noted that this subset is highly biased towards large
firms which may limit the cross sectional variation recorded in this study due to potentially
important variables such as Size. La Porta also only uses data from 1982 – 1991 which
effectively provides me with only two sample periods. La Porta shows that high LTG firms
earn lower subsequent returns.
Secondly, I exclude two very interesting sets of variables from studies considering the
effect of corporate governance on the cost of equity. Skaife, Collins, and Lafond [57] con-
struct large set of governance proxies which are only available from 1996-2002. They regress
Beta on their proxies and find an adjusted R-square of .17. Interestingly, they include the
corporate governance index by Gompers, Ishi, and Metrick [25] and find that although it
is statistically significant at the .01 level, it has a small magnitude. I also exclude the
Gompers/Ishi/Metrick index partly because it only includes data from the 1990’s.
The following variables were considered in this study and their construction is detailed
in Appendix 1.
1. Book Financial Leverage – FL
In theory, Modigliani and Miller argued that a firm’s cost of equity should be an increasing
function of the amount of debt in its capital structure. This result generated an enormous
empirical literature which mostly found that a firm’s Beta increased in both its financial
and operating leverage. In more recent work on financial leverage, Fama and French [18]
found a positive relationship between market leverage and average returns and a negative
relationship between book leverage and average returns, which they explained by noting the
difference between book to market leverage is simply book to market equity. Unfortunately,
they did not directly examine the relationship between these two types of financial leverage
and Beta, nor did they provide correlations. In general, a firm level financial and operating
leverage have been known to increase sensitivity to the business cycle (see Bodie, Kane, and
Marcus [7]). However, I expect an unlevered Beta to decrease in financial leverage because
firms with a substantial portion of debt have a larger portion of their revenues paying off
creditors at a constant rate instead of investing in projects that may be more sensitive to
the business cycle.
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2. Dividend Yield – DY
I expect both types of Betas to decrease in dividend yield because only the managers of
firms with stable earnings in the forseeable future commit to paying dividends. Therefore,
dividend payments signal stable earnings to the market.
3. Assets and Size – Assets / Size
In their widely cited study, Fama and French [18] present evidence that the static CAPM’s
inability to explain average returns is economically important and they demonstrate that
the alternative Book-to-Market and Size model captures the cross sectional variation in
returns originally associated with Beta. Specifically, they find evidence that Beta is highly
correlated with size and that after controlling for size, there is no relation between Beta and
average returns. I expect both types of Beta to increase with Assets or Size because larger
firms have more business projects and more opportunity to be exposed to sensitivities in
the business cycle.
4. Coefficient of Variation of ‘Profit’ – EBIDA / EBIDA A
The variance of a firm’s earnings and cash flows have been included as a predictor of Beta as
early as Guy and Rosenberg [54] and they have maintained their importance as a source of
risk for firm valuation (see Madden [45]). They are also considered by Gebhardt, Lee, and
Swaminathan [22] who believe they most likely capture fundamental cash flow risk and note
there is “no large sample academic study relating earnings variability to cost-of-capital.”
Note that these authors only consider the effect earnings variability, as measured by the
coefficient of variation of annual earnings over the past five years, on the implied cost of
capital. I expect both types of Beta to increase in the coefficient of variation of profit
because larger variation in profit provides more opportunity for the firm to be exposed to
general market movements or economy wide trends.
5. Trading Turnover – TURN
Lee and Swaminathan [40] found firms with high trading volume earned lower future returns
and that trading volume provides information about the market’s relative under or over eval-
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uation of a stock. They also found that low (high) volume stocks display many characteris-
tics commonly associated with value (glamor) investing. Specifically, lower (higher) trading
volume is associated with worse (better) current operating performance, larger (smaller) de-
clines in past operating performance, higher (lower) book-to-market ratios, lower (higher)
analyst followings, lower (higher) long-term earnings growth estimates, higher (lower) factor
loadings on the Fama-French. I expect both types of Beta to increase in Turnover because
Turnover is related to operating leverage.
6. Bid-Ask Spread – BAS
There is a considerable body of theoretical literature which argues that investors require
a higher return for more illiquid stocks (See Habib [26] for a nice overview). Empirically,
liquidity has been difficult to define and the conventional measures can be assigned roughly
into two groups, trade based measures, such as volume, and order based measures, such
as the bid-ask spread. The literature seems to be coalescing around order based measures
(See Roll [53]) and I use the percentage bid ask spread (BAS) proposed by Amihud and
Mendelson [2] as a proxy for firm level liquidity. Amihud and Mendelson determined that
poor liquidity was associated with increased stock returns they provided evidence of a strong
negative correlation between their liquidity proxy and Beta. However, I expect both types
of Beta to increase in bid ask spread because less liquid stocks increase their exposure to
market movements.5
7. Book-to-Market – BM
Fama and French [18] also found that the Betas of BE/ME sorted portfolios have relatively
little variation and Beta is unlikely to affect the strong relationship between book-to-market
and equity. I expect both types of Beta to have a weakly positive relation to book-to-market.
8. Industry Affiliation
A firm’s industry membership has been acknowledged to play a role in the cross-sectional
variation of Beta since Guy and Rosenberg’s [54] seminal paper examining the predictive
5The liquidity measure of Pastor and Stambaugh [51] has recieved tremendous attention for its ability to
predict the cross section of stock returns. I did not include this measure because it appeared to have little
correlation with Beta.
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power of a firm level financial variables. They found that after controlling for six firm level
variables6, industry membership helped to predict Beta. These authors divided firms into
thirty-nine industries and generated Betas using 101 months of data from April 1966 to
August 1974. They determined that a firm’s Beta had a tendency to revert to a historical
average industry Beta and that the magnitude of the industry Betas were different and
stable throughout the sample period. Therefore, Guy and Rosenberg advocated including
an industry ‘adjustment factor’ to proxy for what analysts loosely thought of as industry
risk when exploring the cross sectional variation of Beta. These authors found that their
industry factor was significant at the 95% confidence level for 22 of the 39 industries.
The measurement of industry Betas was indirectly revisited by Fama and French [20].
To explore the accuracy of discount rates used in capital budgeting, the authors noted that
the precision of the risk loadings for industries are an upper bound for the accuracy of firm
or project level rates. The authors estimated the precision of industry costs of capital and
found they had alarmingly high standard errors. For example, if a typical industry had
a five year rolling Beta of 1.0, then two standard errors indicated that the true Beta was
between .76 and 1.24. Fama and French used the sample period from 1963 to 1994 and
they assigned firms to forty eight value weighted industries with the intention of creating
a manageable number of industries that were distinct yet covered the entire spectrum of
stocks.
Besides the concerns about the precision of industry Betas, there is also no current
consensus about the definition of an industry. Gompers, Ishi, and Metrick [25] use an
updated version of Fama and French [20]’s classifications provided on their website. Hou
and Robinson [31] follow Barclay and Smith’s [3] example of using 3-digit SIC industry
classifications, but reporting results for 2-digit and 4-digit classifications. Finally, Lee and
Swaminathan [40] create their own classification system which results in twenty-five indus-
tries. The case for dividing firms into industries becomes even worse when one considers
that many firms are conglomerates with different projects in potentially different lines of
business or ‘industries’.
However, despite the numerous limitations of dividing firms into industries and estimat-
ing industry level Betas, I include them in the study to determine the relative importance of
6The variables were the variance of earnings, variance of cash flows, growth in earnings per share, market
capitalization, dividend yield, and debt-to-assets.
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industry-specific versus firm-specific effects. First of all, industry groups do exhibit consid-
erable dispersion in average returns for a given year. This is partly attributed to different
sensitivity to the business cycle, which can be affected by an industry’s sensitivity to sales.
Industry Affiliation is included as a check because it is difficult for a firm in a troubled in-
dustry to perform well, even if all the firm level variables have been statistically associated
with higher returns or Betas in the past.
3.3.3 Preliminary Statistics
This paper aggregates four non-overlapping five year periods to construct its test statistics.
The periods start in 1986, 1991, 1996, and 2001 and have 103, 271, 329, and 940 number
of observations in each respective period for a total of 1,643 observations. To be explicit,
an observation is a firm with 5 years of complete data for each of the Crsp and Compustat
variables defined in the previous section.7 See Appendix 1 for details. The starting points
of each period were also chosen to maximize the number of observations in each period.
These stringent data requirements may bias the sample towards larger firms, and potentially
diminish the cross sectional variation in Beta due to variables such as size.
The correlation matrices for ‘Book’ regressions and the ‘Market’ regressions for each pe-
riod are provided in Appendices 2 and 3, respectively. For the ‘Book’ regressions, ln(Assets)
and BAS have the largest correlations in absolute value ranging from -.51 to -.66. EBIDA A
has the strongest correlation with BAS at a minimum of .24 and the next strongest correla-
tion in absolute value with ln(Assets) at a minimum in absolute value of -.13. The negative
correlation, in the last case is slightly surprising since I expected larger firms in terms of the
number of assets to have a large coefficient of variation due to the larger standard deviation.
In general, the correlations are larger in absolute value for the ‘Market’ regressions. Once
again ln(Size) and BAS have the largest correlations in absolute value ranging from -.65 to
-.71. EBIDA’s strongest correlation is with BAS for two periods, at a minimum of .2, and
with ln[Size] in absolute value at a minimum of -.23.
Appendices 3 and 4 list the summary statistics for the ‘Book’ and ‘Market’ regressions
for each of the four periods. The mean of Beta A ranges between .78 and 1, while the mean
for Beta ranges between .96 and 1.2. Both Beta and Beta A have observations with negative
7I also checked requiring a firm to have 4 years of all the variables for any time period, but this only
increased the observations by a couple in each time period.
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values and while this is rare, it does occur in gold related stocks, for example. The question
becomes do I view these negative observations as a good estimate of the true Beta or Beta A
, i.e., the true value is actually negative, or do I believe that the true value is actually positive
and that the negative observations may be a result of the measurement error from the first
stage regression? In this study, I view them as the result of measurement error and I will
exclude observations with negative Betas. Financial Leverage, Book-to-Market, Dividends,
Turnover, and Bid-Ask Spread all have observations with negative values even though this
is economically nonsensical. I understand these negative observations as incorrect values
and therefore I drop these observations.
The distributions of EBIDA and EBIDA A raise challenging questions for including them
in estimation. Both EBIDA and EBIDA A are highly skewed and the direction of the skew
is not constant across the time periods. Also, the interquartile range is roughly between 0
and 1.5 for both of the variables in all the time periods. However, in the ‘Book’ regressions,
EBIDA A ranges from -512.9 (1996) to 245 (2001), and in the ‘Market’ regressions, EBIDA
ranges from -394 (1991) to 1023 (1996). While I believe these extreme values are most likely
the result of incorrectly entered data, my data organization is agnostic towards them and
I explore their impact through tests of robustness. The negative earnings observations, in
general, raise some further issues. First, should they be understood as good estimates of
the true value of earnings? Or should they be interpreted as the result of measurement
error? This study will only consider the possibility that they are good estimates of the true
underlying earnings.8 On one hand, the existence of firms with negative 5 year average
earnings is difficult to reconcile with the rational expectations tradition in financial eco-
nomics. Assuming that ex-post estimates can proxy for ex-ante beliefs, no rational investor
would ever invest in a firm with negative expected earnings. Firms with negative earnings
have no place in this theoretical construct. On the other hand, there are obviously firms
that lose money in the real world and it is interesting to see what their association is with
Beta.
My method of cleaning the dataset is motivated by the challenges and issues discussed
above. First, I trim the top and bottom 5% of EBIDA or EBIDA A. This 5% cutoff balances
the tradeoff between including extreme values that are mostly likely mistakes and have
8I also considered the possibility that they were the product of measurement error and used a shrinking
technique to reduce the range until all the earnings were positive. The results of this exercise are available
upon request.
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an undue influence on the regression, with maintaining the original integrity of the data.
However, the next section provides some robust checks where this cutoff level is changed.
Next, I remove the negative values on the rest of the variables in a way that attempts to
maintain the original distribution. Specifically, the data is subjected to an algorithm that
variable by variable, including the dependent variable, determines the number of negative
observations and the corresponding number of largest observations. Once the algorithm
has checked all the observations, it drops any marked observations. Once again, this paper
drops negative Betas because they are most likely the product of measurement error, and
the other independent variables excluding earnings because negative values are nonsensical.
The summary statistics for the variables after this trimming are listed in Appendices 6 and
7.
3.4 Empirical Results
3.4.1 ‘Book’ and ‘Market’ Regression Comparisons
This section reports the estimates for two regressions. The first regression is formed from
the ‘Book’ variables and it is given by
βA = λ
t
o + λ
t
1FL
t + λt2DY
t + λt3Assets
t + λt4TURN
t + λt5BAS
t + λt6EBIDA
t
A + λ
t
7Neg ∗ EBIDAtA + νt,
where each variable is a vector of cross sectional observations and t is a five year period.
The second regression is formed from the ‘Market’ variables and it is given by
β = λto + λ
t
1BM
t + λt2DY
t + λt3Size
t + λt4TURN
t + λt5BAS
t + λt6EBIDA
t + λt7Neg ∗ EBIDAt + νt.
Both regressions have an interaction term on the earnings variable to allow firms with
positive and negative 5 year average earnings to have a different relationship with their
perspective Beta. Appendix 8 provides the results for the ‘Book’ variable regressions and
Appendix 9 for the ‘Market’ variable regression. The top table in each Appendix provides
the estimates for the 2001 subperiod because it has three time as many observations as the
next period, while the bottom two tables provide the pooled estimates aggregated by the
two different methods. Finally, the variables were scaled by their standard deviation to
facilitate coefficient comparison. They were not centered about their mean to preserve the
original signs of EBIDA A and EBIDA.
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There are two difficulties in interpreting the results with this estimation procedure.
Developing a sense of the magnitude of the coefficients is slightly more difficult because
the estimates are pooled. However, it makes sense to use the summary statistics from
the 2001 subperiod as rough benchmark because this time period has three times as many
observations as the next. In this time period, the means of Beta A and Beta were .9391 and
1.198 respectively and the standard deviations were .6377 and .7331 respectively. Secondly,
because there is no analog of R2 for general least squares models, it is very difficult to
compare different models. I include the Buse R2 to used for descriptive and not comparative
purposes.
The ‘Book’ and ‘Market’ regression results share many commonalities. In both regres-
sions, the magnitude of the coefficients is reasonably stable between the two aggregation
methods, in the sense that none of the coefficients switch sign and the relative ranking of
their importance is similar but not exact. The constant in both regressions has the largest
coefficient, which is highly significant. The constant is most likely proxying for some indus-
try level effects, which I examine in the next section. Turnover has the largest of the largest
magnitude of the variable coefficients and t-statistics in all the subperiod and pooled results.
In the pooled regressions, its magnitude hovers around .4, but in the 2001 subperiod it drops
to around .35. Based on the 2001 results, this indicates that a 1 standard deviation change
in Turnover, increases the magnitude of Beta A by .22 and Beta by .25. On the other hand,
in the ‘Book’ regressions, ln(Assets) consistently has the smallest coefficient and t-statistic,
which indicates this variable has no additional explanatory power beyond its use for scaling.
However, in the ‘Market’ regressions, both Book-to-Market and ln(Size) compete for the
smallest coefficient and t-statistic. This result supports Fama and French [18] finding that
Book-to-Market are not strongly associated, but it contradicts their finding that Beta is
highly correlated with Size.
The ‘Book’ and ‘Market’ regression results reflect some important differences concerning
Financial Leverage, Dividends, and Bid Ask Spread. In the ‘Book’ regressions, Financial
Leverage has the second largest coefficient in absolute value of -.23. This indicates that a
one standard deviation increase in the financial leverage of a firm decreases the magnitude
of Beta A by roughly .15. In comparison, Book-to-Market has much smaller magnitude
coefficient than Financial Leverage and it has the opposite sign. This leads me to conclude
these two variables are playing different roles in their respective regressions. The coefficient
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on Dividends varies the most between ‘Book’ and ‘Market’ regressions and the two different
subperiod aggregation methods. In the ‘Book’ regressions, the magnitude is about -.08,
while in the ‘Market’ regressions, it ranges from -.06 to -.15 in the 2001 subperiod.
The ‘Book’ and ‘Market’ regressions portray a striking difference in the relationship
between the ‘earnings’ variable and Beta for firms with positive 5 year average earnings and
firms with negative 5 year average earnings. In particular, both regressions indicate that
as the ‘earnings’ variable increases for positive firms (decreases for negative firms), Beta A
increases. However, the effect is stronger for firms with negative average 5 year earnings
and this difference has a large t-statistic. In the 2001 ‘Book’ regressions, which have the
smallest coefficients, the coefficient for firms with positive 5 year average earnings is .08,
while it is roughly -.23 for firms with negative 5 year average earnings. This indicates that
for a one standard deviation change in the absolute value of earnings, Beta increases in
magnitude by .05 for firms with positive earnings and .15 for firms with negative earnings.
The result is very similar in the ‘Market’ regressions. Focusing on the 2001 subperiod,
which is slightly larger magnitude coefficients than the pooled result, the magnitudes are
.14 and -.2 for firms with positive and negative average earnings respectively. This indicates
that that a one standard deviation change in the absolute value of earnings, increases Beta
by a magnitude of .1 and .15 for firms with positive and negative 5 year average earnings.
While the effect for firms with negative earnings is three times larger than for firms with
positive earnings in the ‘Book’ regressions, it is only roughly one and half times as large
in the ‘Market’ regression. However, this provides evidence that the Betas of firms with
negative average earnings are more sensitive to changes in the earnings variable, than the
Betas of firms with positive average earnings.
3.4.2 Robust Checks
This section reports the results for two different tests on the robustness of some of the
previous results. The purpose of the first test is to see how sensitive the results for EBIDA A
or EBIDA are to perturbations in the top and bottom percentage of observations that are
trimmed from this variable. Only, the top and bottom percentage of observations trimmed
are altered. Otherwise, the rest of the data preparation and the regressions were exactly
the same as in the previous section. The results for the pooled statistics for both the ‘Book’
and the ‘Market’ variable regressions are listed in Appendix 10. One striking feature of the
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results is that the magnitude of the coefficients for both the positive and negative earnings
variables increases monotonically as a larger percentage of the earnings variable is trimmed.
This result holds true for every observation except for the positive earnings variable trimmed
at 15% in Table 3.32. Furthermore, the difference in the magnitude of the coefficient for
the positive and negative earnings variable increases with the percentage of the earnings
variable trimmed. For example, in the ‘Market’ regression results listed in Table 3.34, the
magnitude for the coefficient on the positive and negative earnings variable is .11 and -.15
when only 1% is trimmed, but the coefficients jump to .17 and -.78 when 15% is trimmed.
Unfortunately, I am forced to conclude that the results for earnings variable are highly
sensitive to the percentage of observations that are trimmed from the top and bottom.
However, I argue that chosing a 5% cutoff balances the effect of extreme observations while
including as many observations as possible.
The purpose of the second test is to take the same regressions listed above, but add
industry effects. Specifically, I replace the constant in the previous regression with 48 in-
dustry fixed effects based on a classification system developed by Fama and French [20] with
updates from Ken French’s webpage. The results for the ‘Book’ regression with industry
effects are listed in Appendix 11, while the analogous results for the ‘Market’ regression
are listed in Appendix 12. However, the results for the industry dummies are not included
in the Appendices. By comparing the ‘Book’ regression with and without industry effects
(i.e., Appendix 8 vs. Appendix 11) and the ‘Market’ regression in the same manner (i.e.,
Appendix 9 vs. Appendix 12), the industry dummies have virtually no effect on the re-
sults. While it is possible that the industry dummies have no explanatory power, i.e., they
are simply added noise, and they have an average t-statistic of roughly 20 for the pooled
statistics for both the ‘Book’ and the ‘Market’ regressions. Therefore, I believe it is more
likely that the original variables are capturing within industry effects and not proxying for
industry characteristics.9
3.4.3 Conclusion
The objective of this paper was to explore the cross-sectional determinants of Beta using
recent data and newer econometric techniques. The two main goals of this exercise was to
9I also ran ‘Book’ and ‘Market’ regression without Turnover and the Bid Ask Spread to make sure that
multicolinearity were not driving the results. This dramatically increased the result on the earnings variables.
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understand the explanatory power of popular asset pricing variables and firm level variables,
such as the coefficient of variation of profit. The estimation was largely based on a procedure
developed by Lehmann [41] and permited the estimation of dataset where the number of
cross sectional observations is larger than the number of time period, so that imprecise
portfolio sorting procedures do not have to be used. It also accounted for the measurement
error in Beta in the asymptotic covariance matrix of the estimates, which placed more
weight on observations whose Beta was estimated more accurately. To explore the potential
of scaling earnings, I used two different sets of variables where one is weighted by assets,
referred to as ‘Book variables’ and the other is weighted by market capitalization, referred
to as ‘Market’ variables. Finally, I included two robust checks, one of which included adding
industry fixed effects.
I found some striking results with respect to both the two asset pricing variables and
the coefficient of variation of profit proxy. Since my statistics were pooled over different
time period, I cite the statistics from the 2001 subperiod because it has three times as many
observations as the rest of the periods combined. Turnover had the largest magnitude and
t-statistics in both sets of regressions. In 2001, the means of Beta A and Beta were .94
and 1.2 respectively. I found that a one standard deviation change in turnover increased
the magnitude of Beta A by .22 and Beta by .25. The bid ask spread percentage had a
larger magnitude coefficient in the ‘Market’ regressions, which indicated that a one standard
deviation change in this variable increased Beta by .08. On the other hand, I found that
ln(assets), ln(size), and book-to-market had the smallest magnitudes and t-statistics, which
indicates that the first two variables have little explanatory power beyond their scaling effect.
Finally, both regressions indicate that as the ‘earnings’ variable increases (decreases) for
firms with a positive (negative) ‘earnings’ variable, Beta increases. For the 2001 subperiod in
the ‘Market’ regressions, a one standard deviation change in the absolute value of earnings,
increases Beta by a magnitude of .1 and .15 for firms with positive and negative ‘earnings’.
Furthermore, none of the above results were sensitive to the inclusion of industry fixed
effects.
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3.5 Appendices
Appendix 1
This appendix contains the definitions and the construction of the variables used in this study. To ensure that
accounting information is already impounded into stock returns, monthly return data from July of year t to June of
year t+1 is matched with Compustat quarterly and annual industrial data for the fiscal year ending in Dec of t-1.
All Compustat data is calculated on an annual basis, except for the earnings variables, EBIDA A and EBIDA, which
are calculated quarterly for more precise sample analogs. The variables used in the ‘Book’ regressions are scaled by
assets whenever applicable while the variables used in the ‘Market’ regressions are scaled by market capitalization
whenever applicable.
I. ‘Book’ Variables
0) Asset Beta (Beta A) – Asset (Unleveraged) Beta is Beta equity multiplied by a ‘deflating’
factor. The ‘deflating’ factor is quarterly market capitalization taken at the end of the quarter
divided by quarterly market capitalization plus quarterly long term debt item 30 Long Term Debt.
The ‘deflating’ factor is averaged over the five year period before it is multiplied by Beta equity.
1) Book Financial Leverage (FL) – Annual total long term debt divided by assets. Total long
term debt is Compustat annual item 9 (Total long-term debt) and assets is annual item 6 (Assets).
FL is averaged over a 5 year period.
2) Dividend Yield (DY) – Annual dividends divided by market capitalization multiplied by
100. Dividends are defined as annual item 19 (Preferred dividends) plus annual item 21 (Common
dividends). CRSP market capitalization is Price multiplied by the Number of Shares Outstanding
in December of each year. DY is averaged over a 5 year period.
3) Assets (Assets) – Annual assets (annual item 6 (Total long-term debt)) are averaged over a 5
year period and the natural log is taken of the result.
4) Coefficient of Variation of Profit (EBIDA A) – Coefficient of variation of profit is formed
from quarterly cash flows divided by assets. Cash flows are quarterly earnings item 8 (Income before
extraordinary items) plus quarterly item 22 (Interest expense) plus quarterly item 5 (Depreciation
and amortization). Quarterly assets is quarterly item 44 Assets. Then the five year standard
deviation and expectation are taken of the quarterly cash flows divided by market capitalization.
5) Trading Turnover (TURN) – Trading turnover is the monthly share volume divided by the
monthly number of shares outstanding in CRSP. Turn is averaged over a 5 year period. [See Lee
and Swaminathan [40] Note that the authors defined the variable as average daily turnover in their
study.]
6) Percentage Bid-Ask Spread (BAS) – Bid-Ask Spread is the absolute value of the monthly
bid ask spreads divided by the monthly market capitalization multiplied by 100. Monthly bid ask
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spread is defined Monthly CRSP Closing bid minus Closing Ask. BAS is the 5 year average.[See
Amihud and Mendelson [2]. Note that these authors used annual data from Fitch’s Stock Quotations
of the NYSE.]
II. ‘Market’ Variables
0) Equity Beta (Beta) – Beta is calculated from a stand single index market model over a five
year period.
1) Book-to-Market (BM) – Book equity divided by market equity. Book equity is shareholder
equity, plus deferred taxes and minus preferred stock. Shareholder equity is annual item 216 (Stock-
holders equity) if available, or else item 60 + item 130 (Common equity) + (Carrying value of
preferred stock) if available, or item 6 minus item 181 (Total assets) – (Total liabilities). Deferred
taxes is item 35 (Deferred taxes and investment tax credits) if available, or item 74 and/or item
208 (Deferred taxes) and/or (Investment tax credit). Book value of preferred stock is item 56 (Re-
demption value of preferred stock), if available, or item 10 (Liquidating value of preferred stock),
or item 130 (Carrying value of preferred stock). Shareholder equity is also reduced by item 330
(Post retirement benefit assets) if available. Market equity is constructed in variable 2 above. BM
is averaged over a 5 year period. [See Novy-Marx [50], whose definition is constructed on that of
Fama and French [19]].
2) Dividend Yield (DY) – Annual dividends divided by market capitalization multiplied by
100. Dividends are defined as annual item 19 (Preferred dividends) plus annual item 21 (Common
dividends). CRSP market capitalization is Price multiplied by the Number of Shares Outstanding
in December of each year. DY is averaged over a 5 year period.
3) Size (Size) – Size is the market capitalization. Size is averaged over a 5 year period and the
natural log is taken of the average.
4) Coefficient of Variation of Profit (EBIDA) – Coefficient of variation of profit is formed
from quarterly cash flows divided by the enterprise value. Cash flows are quarterly earnings item
8 (Income before extraordinary items) plus quarterly item 22 (Interest expense) plus quarterly item
5 (Depreciation and amortization). Enterprise value is proxied by quarterly market capitalization
taken at the end of the quarter plus quarterly long term debt item 30 Long Term Debt. Then the
five year standard deviation and expectation are taken of the quarterly cash flows divided by market
capitalization.
5) Trading Turnover (TURN) – Trading turnover is the monthly share volume divided by
monthly number of shares outstanding in CRSP. Turn is averaged over a 5 year period. [See Lee
and Swaminathan [40] Note that the authors defined the variable as average daily turnover in their
study.]
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6) Percentage Bid-Ask Spread (BAS) – Bid-Ask Spread is the absolute value of the monthly
bid ask spreads divided by the monthly market capitalization multiplied by 100. Monthly bid ask
spread is defined Monthly CRSP Closing bid minus Closing Ask. BAS is the 5 year average. (See
Amihud and Mendelson [2]). Note that these authors used annual data from Fitch’s Stock Quotations
of the NYSE ]
III. Industry Variables
1) Industry Classification – 48 industries based on the classification system used in Fama and
French [20] with updates from Ken French’s website.
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Appendix 2: Correlation Matrices for ‘Book’ Variables
Table 3.1: 1986 Subperiod ‘Book’ Correlation Matrix
1986 FL DY ln(Assets) TURN BAS EBIDA A
FL 1 -.182 .279 -.031 -.090 -.157
DY 1 .107 -.301 -.118 .023
ln(Assets) 1 .181 -.662 -.237
TURN 1 -.256 -.059
BAS 1 .369
EBIDA A 1
Table 3.2: 1991 Subperiod ‘Book’ Correlation Matrix
1991 FL DY ln(Assets) TURN BAS EBIDA A
FL 1 .049 .219 -.109 .008 -.115
DY 1 .392 -.251 -.230 -.181
ln(Assets) 1 .201 -.661 -.276
TURN 1 -.293 .148
BAS 1 .385
EBIDA A 1
Table 3.3: 1996 Subperiod ‘Book’ Correlation Matrix
1996 FL DY ln(Assets) TURN BAS EBIDA A
FL 1 -.091 .084 -.001 .166 .104
DY 1 .407 -.079 -.163 -.055
ln(Assets) 1 .203 -.512 -.129
TURN 1 -.234 .031
BAS 1 .240
EBIDA A 1
Table 3.4: 2001 Subperiod ‘Book’ Correlation Matrix
2001 FL DY ln(Assets) TURN BAS EBIDA A
FL 1 .001 .215 -.014 -.052 -.028
DY 1 .051 -.045 .042 .072
ln(Assets) 1 .044 -.615 -.142
TURN 1 -.184 .105
BAS 1 .246
EBIDA A 1
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Appendix 3: Correlation Matrices for ‘Market’ Variables
Table 3.5: 1986 Subperiod ‘Market’ Correlation Matrix
1986 BM DY ln(Size) TURN BAS EBIDA
BM 1 -.031 -.457 -.062 .163 .075
DY 1 .405 .215 -.273 -.282
ln(Size) 1 .118 -.652 -.361
TURN 1 -.121 -.041
BAS 1 .393
EBIDA 1
Table 3.6: 1991 Subperiod ‘Market’ Correlation Matrix
1991 BM DY ln(Size) TURN BAS EBIDA
BM 1 .214 -.250 -.091 .056 .080
DY 1 .419 -.215 -.301 -.274
ln(Size) 1 .345 -.660 -.469
TURN 1 -.306 -.009
BAS 1 .400
EBIDA 1
Table 3.7: 1996 Subperiod ‘Market’ Correlation Matrix
1996 BM DY ln(Size) TURN BAS EBIDA
BM 1 -.000 -.491 -.254 .386 .076
DY 1 .358 -.110 -.151 -.020
ln(Size) 1 .336 -.685 -.236
TURN 1 -.237 .072
BAS 1 .200
EBIDA 1
Table 3.8: 2001 Subperiod ‘Market’ Correlation Matrix
2001 BM DY ln(Size) TURN BAS EBIDA
BM 1 .062 -.316 -.075 .304 .161
DY 1 .006 -.148 .010 .099
ln(Size) 1 .078 -.710 -.283
TURN 1 -.156 .103
BAS 1 .316
EBIDA 1
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Appendix 4: Summary Statistics for ‘Book’ Variables
Table 3.9: 1986 Subperiod ‘Book’ Summary Statistics
1986 Beta A FL DY ln(Asset) TURN BAS EBIDA A
Min -1.875 0 -3.593 3.902 .7132 -6.456 -47.42
Max 2.119 1.894 34.13 6214 31.30 15.05 244.6
Mean .8375 .2282 1.768 335.1 6.466 3.717 2.347
SD .5196 .2453 4.035 772.7 5.229 2.690 25.64
LowerQ .5240 .0670 0 38.99 2.904 2.245 .1986
Median .8129 .1697 0 104.1 4.672 3.306 .3343
UpperQ 1.143 .3086 2.443 274.7 9.448 4.867 .7376
Obser. 103 103 103 103 103 103 103
Neg. Obser. 1 0 2 0 0 3 12
Table 3.10: 1991 Subperiod ‘Book’ Summary Statistics
1991 Beta A FL DY ln(Asset) TURN BAS EBIDA A
Min -3.584 0 17.6 2.374 .1739 -16.48 -114.6
Max 5.148 1.099 269.6 14930 52.05 25.60 48.96
Mean .8398 .1726 2.113 391.2 8.693 3.567 .5659
SD .9087 .1687 17.20 1469 7.850 3.849 10.27
LowerQ .3319 .0377 0 23.09 2.958 2.054 .1901
Median .7349 .1302 0 59.78 6.599 3.390 .4045
UpperQ 1.300 .2585 .8778 217.7 11.73 5.597 1.052
Obser. 271 271 271 271 271 271 271
Neg. Obser. 25 0 17 0 0 18 31
Table 3.11: 1996 Subperiod ‘Book’ Summary Statistics
1996 Beta A FL DY ln(Asset) TURN BAS EBIDA A
Min -2.779 0 -2.487 3.009 6.557 -4.445 -521.9
Max 3.531 .8731 9.718 37760 63.62 13.85 196.0
Mean .7863 .1890 .4071 1260 11.67 2.314 -.6239
SD .7917 .1860 1.117 4706 10.29 1.889 31.50
LowerQ .2721 .0312 0 42.95 4.248 1.100 .1231
Median .5575 .1413 0 114.0 9.384 1.983 .3043
UpperQ 1.218 .2800 0 307.4 15.28 3.182 .6843
Obser. 329 329 329 329 329 329 329
Neg. Obser. 18 0 5 0 0 11 67
Table 3.12: 2001 Subperiod ‘Book’ Summary Statistics
2001 Beta A FL DY ln(Asset) TURN BAS EBIDA A
Min -.9974 0 0 2.065 .2910 -1.339 -341.7
Max 5.075 1.654 465.3 1163000 118.6 6.381 245.0
Mean 1.027 .2125 3.169 6228 16.10 .6362 -1.277
SD .8214 .2000 23.49 43950 12.97 .7443 17.33
LowerQ .5045 .0537 0 131.6 7.953 .1981 .1403
Median .8116 .1816 0 615.8 13.20 .3626 .2921
UpperQ 1.337 .3048 1.440 2700 20.89 .7805 .6490
Obser. 940 940 940 940 940 940 940
Neg. Obser. 20 0 0 0 0 9 168
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Appendix 5: Summary Statistics for ‘Market’ Variables
Table 3.13: 1986 Subperiod ‘Market’ Summary Statistics
1986 Beta BM DY ln(Size) TURN BAS EBIDA
Min .1725 -.6882 -3.593 11900000 .7132 -6.456 -28.12
Max 2.522 5.081 34.13 7070000000 31.30 15.05 12.74
Mean 1.124 .9456 1.768 336000000 6.466 3.717 .1528
SD .4561 .8419 4.035 1040000000 5.229 2.690 4.503
LowerQ .8188 .4535 0 21600000 2.904 2.245 .2339
Median 1.127 .7935 0 64300000 4.672 3.306 .4087
UpperQ 1.404 1.156 2.443 1.80000000 9.448 4.867 1.0901
Obser. 103 103 103 103 103 103 103
Neg. Obser. 0 2 2 3 0 3 13
Table 3.14: 1991 Subperiod ‘Market’ Summary Statistics
1991 Beta BM DY ln(Size) TURN BAS EBIDA
Min -1.294 -1.167 -17.6 -10500000 .1739 -16.47 -394.4
Max 4.329 9.305 269.6 44800000000 52.05 25.60 128.6
Mean .9695 .6698 2.113 496000000 8.693 3.567 -9.108
SD .7849 .8146 17.20 2940000000 7.849 3.849 28.17
LowerQ .5059 .2588 0 14700000 2.958 2.054 .1460
Median .8693 .5522 0 217000000 6.599 3.390 .4192
UpperQ 1.410 .9172 .8777 217000000 11.73 5.597 1.577
Obser. 271 271 271 271 271 271 271
Neg. Obser. 22 16 17 17 0 18 63
Table 3.15: 1996 Subperiod ‘Market’ Summary Statistics
1996 Beta BM DY ln(Size) TURN BAS EBIDA
Min -.7775 -1.554 -2.487 -12400000 .6557 -4.445 -76.46
Max 3.696 10.01 9.718 220000000000 63.62 13.85 1024
Mean .9631 .7406 .4071 2480000000 11.67 2.314 4.417
SD .7822 .8313 1.117 14500000000 10.29 1.889 57.53
LowerQ .3898 .2983 0 33000000 4.248 1.100 .1670
Median .7737 .5802 0 108000000 9.384 1.983 .4353
UpperQ 1.457 .9639 0 393000000 15.28 3.182 1.131
Obser. 329 329 329 329 329 329 329
Neg. Obser. 15 9 5 7 0 11 79
Table 3.16: 2001 Subperiod ‘Market’ Summary Statistics
2001 Beta BM DY ln(Size) TURN BAS EBIDA
Min -1.090 -11.14 0 -7820000 .2910 -1.339 -255.0
Max 5.269 84.73 465.3 325000000000 118.6 6.381 190.7
Mean 1.287 .9574 3.169 4800000000 16.10 .6362 .1489
SD .9184 4.085 23.49 17400000000 12.97 .7443 13.67
LowerQ .6944 .3251 0 167000000 7.953 .1981 .1577
Median 1.103 .5377 0 7020000000 13.20 .3626 .3287
UpperQ 1.665 .8445 1.440 2790000000 20.89 .7805 .7030
Obser. 940 940 940 940 940 940 940
Neg. Obser. 18 30 0 3 0 9 188
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Appendix 6: Summary Statistics for ‘Book’ Variables after Trimming
Algorithm
The top and bottom 5% of EBIDA A are trimmed. Next, the remaining variables are subjected to an
algorithm that variable by variable, including Beta A, determines the number of negative observations and
the corresponding number of largest observations. Once the algorithm has checked all the observations, it
drops any marked observations.
Table 3.17: Trimmed 1986 Subperiod ‘Book’ Summary Statistics
1986 Beta A FL DY ln(Assets) TURN BAS EBIDA A
Min .0973 0 0 3.902 .7132 .5257 -2.092
Max 1.942 1.894 10.98 6214 21.82 8.268 2.181
Mean .8610 .2299 1.600 400.4 6.387 3.463 .4809
SD .4025 .2542 2.272 858.8 4.678 1.859 .6378
LowerQ .5595 .0810 0 37.05 3.007 2.151 .2112
Median .8270 .1852 .0072 151.7 4.785 3.027 .3343
UpperQ 1.137 .2957 2.504 368.3 9.413 4.531 .6839
Obser. 81 81 81 81 81 81 81
Neg. Obser. 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Table 3.18: Trimmed 1991 Subperiod ‘Book’ Summary Statistics
1991 Beta A FL DY ln(Assets) TURN BAS EBIDA A
Min .0184 0 0 3.217 .1739 .2813 -2.213
Max 1.968 .8551 4.973 14930 52.05 7.175 5.318
Mean .8162 .1776 .7293 605.8 9.985 3.412 .6787
SD .4903 .1683 1.273 1909 8.553 1.778 1.092
LowerQ .4191 .0363 0 37.00 3.586 2.004 .1930
Median .7544 .1325 0 108.8 7.924 3.200 .3712
UpperQ 1.126 .2874 1.030 337.6 13.17 4.873 .9135
Obser. 154 154 154 154 154 154 154
Neg. Obser. 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
Table 3.19: Trimmed 1996 Subperiod ‘Book’ Summary Statistics
1996 Beta A FL DY ln(Assets) TURN BAS EBIDA A
Min .0036 0 0 4.704 .8757 .0693 -3.217
Max 2.110 .8199 3.904 37760 63.62 6.087 2.666
Mean .7222 .1957 .3666 1595 11.15 2.171 .2762
SD .5508 .1833 .8018 5392 9.127 1.345 .8857
LowerQ .3029 .0516 0 52.55 5.016 1.068 .1494
Median .5518 .1523 0 146.3 9.315 1.958 .2968
UpperQ 1.045 .2845 .0773 393.9 14.52 2.948 .5972
Obser. 240 240 240 240 240 240 240
Neg. Obser. 0 0 0 0 0 0 36
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Table 3.20: Trimmed 2001 Subperiod ‘Book’ Summary Statistics
2001 Beta A FL DY ln(Assets) TURN BAS EBIDA A
Min .0004 0 0 2.065 .2910 .0496 -4.546
Max 3.321 1.654 465.3 1163000 118.6 3.607 4.358
Mean .9391 .2192 2.872 7004.9 15.81 .5577 .3370
SD .6377 .1967 20.21 47682 12.47 .5988 1.002
LowerQ .5013 .0643 0 177.2 8.268 .1919 .1619
Median .7863 .1942 0 812.3 13.10 .3261 .2975
UpperQ 1.200 .3096 1.670 3185 20.23 .6690 .5906
Obser. 794 794 v 794 794 794 794
Neg. Obser. 0 0 0 0 0 0 100
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Appendix 7: Summary Statistics for ‘Market’ Variables after Trimming
Algorithm
The top and bottom 5% of EBIDA are trimmed. Next, the remaining variables are subjected to an algo-
rithm that variable by variable, including Beta, determines the number of negative observations and the
corresponding number of largest observations. Once the algorithm has checked all the observations, it drops
any marked observations.
Table 3.21: Trimmed 1986 Subperiod ‘Market’ Summary Statistics
1986 Beta BM DY Size TURN BAS EBIDA
Min .1952 .0360 0 2252000 .7132 .5257 -2.605
Max 2.117 3.645 10.98 3660000000 18.60 8.350 3.145
Mean 1.160 .8819 1.488 235000000 6.114 3.718 .5721
SD .4231 .5962 2.182 506000000 4.310 1.950 .9076
LowerQ .8327 .4485 0 26800000 3.007 2.421 .2633
Median 1.180 .7761 0 69700000 4.651 3.306 .3874
UpperQ 1.409 1.132 2.403 203000000 8.965 4.837 .7506
Obser. 81 81 81 81 81 81 81
Neg. Obser. 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
Table 3.22: Trimmed 1991 Subperiod ‘Market’ Summary Statistics
1991 Beta BM DY Size TURN BAS EBIDA
Min .0279 .0574 0 153300 .8427 .6648 -9.169
Max 2.067 1.650 5.242 1040000000 52.05 8.553 9.345
Mean .9486 .6388 .7078 202000000 8.940 3.720 .6711
SD .5057 .3921 1.311 247000000 7.403 1.790 2.819
LowerQ .5829 .3402 0 31200000 3.586 2.303 .2121
Median .8928 .5833 0 97400000 7.294 3.362 .3739
UpperQ 1.309 .8988 .7532 253000000 11.75 5.118 1.242
Obser. 143 143 143 143 143 143 143
Neg. Obser. 0 0 0 0 0 0 20
Table 3.23: Trimmed 1996 Subperiod ‘Market’ Summary Statistics
1996 Beta BM DY Size TURN BAS EBIDA
Min .0093 .0020 0 933000 .8757 .2528 -3.894
Max 2.367 2.583 3.517 29800000000 63.62 6.452 8.505
Mean .9549 .7152 .3140 1090000000 11.70 2.179 .5810
SD .6189 .5112 .7335 3720000000 9.563 1.309 1.634
LowerQ .4631 .3366 0 41100000 5.199 1.190 .2272
Median .8143 .5897 0 142000000 9.925 1.960 .4281
UpperQ 1.433 .9614 0 441000000 14.96 2.848 .8259
Obser. 235 235 235 235 235 235 235
Neg. Obser. 0 0 0 0 0 0 42
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Table 3.24: Trimmed 2001 Subperiod ‘Market’ Summary Statistics
2001 Beta BM DY Size TURN BAS EBIDA
Min .0008 .0054 0 4899000 .2910 .0496 -4.792
Max 3.842 2.163 106.2 141000000000 118.6 3.607 3.516
Mean 1.198 .6122 1.455 4940000000 15.74 .5591 .2407
SD .7331 .4024 5.273 14000000000 11.89 .5982 1.138
LowerQ .7035 .3336 0 222000000 8.321 .1911 .1876
Median 1.075 .5284 0 908000000 13.35 .3181 .3262
UpperQ 1.532 .7856 1.481 3160000000 20.34 .6734 .6313
Obser. 760 760 760 760 760 760 760
Neg. Obser. 0 0 0 0 0 0 117
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Appendix 8: Results for ‘Book’ Variable Regression
This table includes results for the following regression:
βA = λ
t
o + λ
t
1FL
t + λt2DY
t + λt3Assets
t + λt4TURN
t + λt5BAS
t + λt6EBIDA A
t + λt7Neg ∗ EBIDA At + νt.
The data for this regression had the top and bottom 5% of EBIDA A trimmed. Next, the remaining
variables were subjected to an algorithm that variable by variable, including Beta A, determined the number
of negative observations and the corresponding number of largest observations. Once the algorithm has
checked all the observations, it droped any marked observations. Finally, the variables were scaled by their
standard deviation.
Table 3.25: ‘Book’ 2001 Subperiod Estimates
2001 Coefficient Standard Error t-test
FL -.2394 .0046 -51.8
DY -.0807 .0027 -30.0
ln(Assets) .0093 .0016 5.7
TURN .3419 .0088 38.9
BAS .1075 .0124 8.7
EBIDA A .0759 .0063 12.0
NEG*EBIDA A -.3090 .0178 -17.4
Constant .9773 .0126 77.8
R-squared = 0.2213, Adjusted R-squared = 0.2144, F-statistic = 31.9
Table 3.26: ‘Book’ Pooled Estimates Aggregated by Covariance Matrices
Pooled Cov Coefficient Standard Error t-test
FL -.2276 .0032 -70.1
DY -.0823 .0022 -38.2
ln(Assets) .0129 .0014 8.9
TURN .4185 .0055 75.5
BAS .0674 .0064 10.6
EBIDA A .0969 .0049 19.8
NEG*EBIDA A -.4049 .0151 -26.9
Constant 1.022 .0102 99.8
Table 3.27: ‘Book’ Pooled Estimates Aggregated by # Subperiod Observations
Pooled Obs Coefficient Standard Error t-test
FL -.2261 .0036 -62.1
DY -.0732 .0025 -29.9
ln(Assets) .0054 .0022 2.5
TURN .3950 .0069 57.1
BAS .0455 .0089 5.1
EBIDA A .0719 .0059 12.3
NEG*EBIDA A -.4647 .0188 -24.8
Constant 1.024 .0123 83.0
R-squared = 0.2896, Adjusted R-squared = 0.2750, F-statistic = 73.4
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Appendix 9: Results for ‘Market’ Variable Regression
This table includes results for the following regression:
β = λto + λ
t
1BM
t + λt2DY
t + λt3Size
t + λt4TURN
t + λt5BAS
t + λt6EBIDA
t + λt7Neg ∗ EBIDAt + νt.
The data for this regression had the top and bottom 5% of EBIDA trimmed. Next, the remaining variables
were subjected to an algorithm that variable by variable, including Beta, determined the number of negative
observations and the corresponding number of largest observations. Once the algorithm has checked all
the observations, it droped any marked observations. Finally, the variables were scaled by their standard
deviation.
Table 3.28: ‘Market’ 2001 Subperiod Estimates
2001 Coefficient Standard Error t-test
BM .0474 .0053 8.9
DY -.1596 .0069 -23.2
Size .0475 .0036 13.4
TURN .3680 .0092 40.0
BAS .1440 .0124 11.6
EBIDA .1383 .0093 14.9
NEG*EBIDA -.3385 .0179 -18.9
Constant .6932 .0145 48.0
R-squared = 0.1929, Adjusted R-squared = 0.1854, F-statistic = 25.7
Table 3.29: ‘Market’ Pooled Estimates Aggregated by Covariance Matrices
Pooled cov Coefficient Standard Error t-test
BM .0734 .0038 19.5
DY -.0611 .0034 -17.9
Size .0377 .0028 13.5
TURN .4451 .0059 76.0
BAS .1181 .0060 19.5
EBIDA .0891 .0056 15.9
NEG*EBIDA -.2213 .0120 -18.5
Constant .7022 .0116 60.8
Table 3.30: ‘Market’ Pooled Estimates Aggregated by # Subperiod Observations
Pooled obs Coefficient Standard Error t-test
BM .0206 .0048 4.3
DY -.1239 .0046 -26.7
Size .0403 .0038 11.9
TURN .4462 .0075 59.8
BAS .1141 .0090 12.6
EBIDA .1184 .0066 17.9
NEG*EBIDA -.2828 .0151 -18.7
Constant .7717 .0147 52.7
R-squared = 0.2564, Adjusted R-squared = 0.2404, F-statistic = 59.7
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Appendix 10: Robust Results for EBIDA A and EBIDA
The following results provide the effects on EBIDA A or EBIDA after the top and bottom 5% percentage
of observations trimmed from these variables was perturbed. The percentage of observations trimmed from
the top and bottom is listed in the left hand column of each table. Otherwise, the rest of the data preparation
and the regressions were exactly the same as in Appendices 8 and 9.
Table 3.31: ‘Book’ Regression - Pooled Covariance
EBIDA A SE t-stat NEG*EBIDA A SE t-stat
1% .0597 .0068 16.3 -.1553 .0089 -17.5
5% .0970 .0049 19.8 -.4049 .0151 -26.9
10% .1524 .0040 38.3 -.8335 .0242 -34.5
15% .1248 .0040 31.2 -1.0239 .0329 -31.1
Table 3.32: ‘Book’ Regression - Pooled Observations
EBIDA A SE t-stat NEG*EBIDA A SE t-stat
1% .0671 .0059 11.3 -.1927 .0102 -18.9
5% .0719 .0059 12.3 -.4647 .0187 -24.8
10% .1570 .0050 31.1 -1.028 .0324 -31.7
15% .1250 .0045 27.6 -1.061 .0332 -32.0
Table 3.33: ‘Market’ Regression - Pooled Covariance
EBIDA SE t-stat NEG*EBIDA SE t-stat
1% .0449 .0057 7.9 -.1459 .0085 -17.1
5% .0891 .0056 16.0 -.2213 .0120 -18.5
10% .1518 .0048 31.7 -.3746 .0136 -27.6
15% .2184 .0043 50.1 -.9048 .0208 -43.4
Table 3.34: ‘Market’ Regression - Pooled Observations
EBIDA SE t-stat NEG*EBIDA SE t-stat
1% .1053 .0066 16.0 -.2571 .0139 -18.5
5% .1185 .0066 17.9 -.2827 .0151 -18.7
10% .1466 .0056 26.0 -.6476 .0245 -26.4
15% .1682 .0050 33.2 -.9522 .0259 -36.8
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Appendix 11: ‘Book’ Regressions with Industry Effects
For the results in this table, the data preparation and the regression was exactly the same as in
Appendix 8, except 48 industry fixed effects replaced the constant. The 48 industry variables were
developed by a classification system used in Fama and French [20] with updates from Ken French’s
webpage. Note that the results for the industry dummy are excluded from the tables.
Table 3.35: ‘Book’ 2001 Subperiod Estimates with Industry Effects
2001 Coefficient Standard Error t-test
FL -.2217 .0050 -44.7
DY -.0827 .0028 -29.7
ln(Assets) .0102 .0017 6.0
TURN .2959 .0075 39.6
BAS .0946 .0118 8.0
EBIDA .0961 .0065 14.7
NEG*EBIDA A -.2940 .0155 -19.0
R-squared = 0.3768, Adjusted R-squared = 0.3313, F-statistic = 8.3
Table 3.36: ‘Book’ Pooled Estimates Aggregated by Covariance Matrices with Industry
Effects
Pooled Cov Coefficient Standard Error t-test
FL -.2177 .0024 -91.7
DY -.0694 .0016 -42.7
ln(Assets) .0045 .0011 4.1
TURN .3772 .0034 111.0
BAS .0631 .0041 15.4
EBIDA .1257 .0038 33.2
NEG*EBIDA A .4508 .0104 -43.4
Table 3.37: ‘Book’ Pooled Estimates Aggregated by # Subperiod Observations with Indus-
try Effects
Pooled Obs Coefficient Standard Error t-test
FL -.2114 .0041 -51.9
DY -.0760 .0027 -27.7
ln(Assets) -.0073 .0025 -3.0
TURN .3524 .0064 54.8
BAS .0346 .0089 3.9
EBIDA .0872 .0063 13.7
NEG*EBIDA A -.4710 .0167 -28.2
R-squared = 0.4443, Adjusted R-squared = 0.3117, F-statistic = 18.0
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Appendix 12: ‘Market’ Regressions with Industry Effects
For the results in this table, the data preparation and the regression was exactly the same as in Appendix
8, except 48 industry fixed effects replaced the constant. The 48 industry variables were developed by a
classification system used in Fama and French [20] with updates from Ken French’s webpage. Note that the
results for the industry dummy are excluded from the tables.
Table 3.38: ‘Market’ 2001 Subperiod Estimates with Industry Effects
2001 Coefficient Standard Error t-test
BM .1168 .0049 24.0
DY -.1679 .0054 -31.1
Size .0642 .0038 16.9
TURN .3366 .0071 47.2
BAS .1187 .0114 10.4
EBIDA .1417 .0096 14.8
NEG*EBIDA -.2964 .0157 -18.8
R-squared = 0.3715, Adjusted R-squared = 0.3234, F-statistic = 7.7
Table 3.39: ‘Market’ Pooled Estimates Aggregated by Covariance Matrices with Industry
Effects
Pooled Cov Coefficient Standard Error t-test
BM .0706 .0030 23.8
DY -.0180 .0024 -7.5
Size .0582 .0021 28.1
TURN .3440 .0035 97.1
BAS .0674 .0038 17.6
EBIDA .1358 .0039 35.1
NEG*EBIDA -.2929 .0089 -33.0
Table 3.40: ‘Market’ Pooled Estimates Aggregated by # Subperiod Observations with
Industry Effects
Pooled Obs Coefficient Standard Error t-test
BM .0218 .0049 4.5
DY -.1265 .0040 -31.5
Size .0375 .0039 9.7
TURN .4020 .0060 66.8
BAS .0998 .0087 11.5
EBIDA .1378 .0072 19.2
NEG*EBIDA -.2991 .0153 -19.5
R-squared = 0.4344, Adjusted R-squared = 0.2965, F-statistic = 16.6
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